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Abstract
Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. v. D.H. and B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of
Metropolitan Toronto tell important stories about people and relationships—and about
parenthood; autonomy; religious believers and cultural communities; and the role of the
state in family, culture, and religion. Their narratives were influenced by liberalism and
emphasize a degree of individualism that is incongruous given the subject matter of
parent-child relationships and their place within communities and the law. This thesis
explores the application of relational theory and the integrated principles of justice and
care to these issues. Ultimately, the stories these judicial opinions tell help to foster or
undermine actual relationships, including between the law and other cultures. Legal
actors persuaded of the inadequacy of such narratives are urged to find new ways of
telling these stories and resolving the dilemmas they pose, and demonstrating thus the
law’s capacity to be both just and caring.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In my early days at law school, and somewhat counter to my initial expectations, I
was agreeably taken aback by the discovery that I enjoyed reading judicial opinions. I felt
like I was reading stories, and Nancy Cook’s statement that “[t]he courts ultimately relate
stories through judicial opinions”1 resonated with me. The narratives could be highly
engaging, holding the power to draw out visceral emotions, especially when they
determined issues that matter a great deal to the way in which we lead and give meaning
to our lives, in which case they could inspire a strong sense of hope, optimism, and
belonging; or, contrariwise, arouse deep feelings of anger, resentment, and alienation.
Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. v. D.H.2 and B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of
Metropolitan Toronto,3 the judicial opinions that planted the seeds of reflection for this
thesis, are two such cases. They can be read as telling important stories about individuals
and their relationships—as well as about parenthood; autonomy and agency; religious
believers and cultural communities; the performance of commitments and beliefs; and the
role of the state in matters of family, culture, and religion. These narratives, I will argue,
were shaped by liberalism’s influence on Canadian law and can be construed as
emphasizing a degree of individualism that is somewhat incongruous given that they are
fundamentally stories about parent-child relationships and how these relationships
dovetail within larger communities, various cultural groups, the state, and the law. The
objective of this thesis is to explain this argument and to explore how these narratives

1

Nancy L Cook, “Outside the Tradition: Literature as Legal Scholarship” (1994) 63:1 U Cin L Rev 95
at 95.
2
2014 ONCJ 603, 123 OR (3d) 11 [Hamilton].
3
[1995] 1 SCR 315, 21 OR (3d) 479 [B (R) cited to SCR].
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might have unfolded differently had they taken into consideration certain insights
afforded by relational theory.
After setting up the backdrop created by these cases in the following chapter, I
will examine, in the third chapter, liberalism’s conceptualization of the interests at issue
and the value it places upon individualism; I will also analyze the justifications in family
theory for parental authority and suggest reasons for moving away from a markedly
individualistic conception of these interests. In the fourth chapter, I will explore the
addition of a relational perspective, beginning with a general introduction to relational
theory and its impact upon subjects such as law, family, and parental autonomy. I come to
the realization that, alone, relational theory and its division of “care ethics” are not
enough and must operate alongside justice principles. Finally, I will apply this theory and
the integrated principles of justice and care to the issues at hand, with the help in
particular of the work of Benjamin Berger. Ultimately, my sense is that the stories these
judicial opinions tell about various relationships will themselves influence how members
of different communities relate to one another, how parents conceive of their
responsibilities towards their children, how the state behaves towards its citizens and
autonomous groups, and how the law interacts with other cultural groups. I urge legal
actors, if and when they are persuaded of the inadequacy of the narratives they tell,
absorb, and retell, to do right by the law and those who come before the law, by finding
new ways of telling these stories and resolving the dilemmas they pose, and
demonstrating thus the law’s capacity to be both just and caring.

2

Chapter 2: Context
On November 14, 2014, Justice Gethin B. Edward released the reasons for his
judgment in Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. v. D.H.,4 a decision that sparked a measure
of public—albeit primarily muted—criticism.5 In part owing to the media coverage and
legal interest it elicited, this case reinvigorated the public debate surrounding the role of
culture and religion in the decisions parents make regarding their children’s health care.6
The case involved J.J., an 11-year-old girl from the Six Nations of the Grand
River who had been diagnosed with acute lymphoblastic leukemia. In the opinion of her
medical team, J.J. had a ninety to ninety-five percent cure rate with chemotherapy, and a
zero percent chance of survival without the treatment. J.J. began chemotherapy, but her
mother, D.H., later withdrew her consent for the continuation of the treatment, choosing
to treat J.J. with traditional medicines. As a result of this decision, an application was
made under s. 40(4) of the Child and Family Services Act7 for a declaration that J.J. was a
child was in need of protection.8
The substantive issue before Edward J. was therefore whether the court was
satisfied that there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe that J.J. was a child
in need of protection, the analysis of which usually hinges upon on an assessment of the
4

Supra note 2.
Diana Ginn, “Hamilton Health Sciences Corporation v DH et al” (2015) 4 Oxford JL & Religion 526
at 529.
6
See e.g. Andrew Row, “Life or death, and traditional medicine – primacy of indigenous rights in the
Canadian case of Hamilton Health Sciences Corp”, online: (2015) Māori L Rev <maorilawreview.co.nz/>;
Asher Honickman, “A questionable judgment on ‘traditional medicine’”, National Post (21 November
2014), online: <news.nationalpost.com>; John Edmond, “Aboriginal right – or wrong?”, LawNow (8 March
2015), online: <lawnow.org>; Yamri Taddese, “Cancer decision a shock to lawyers”, Law Times
(2 November 2014), online: <lawtimesnews.com>; Alyshah Hasham, “Aboriginal medicine ruling sparks
instant controversy”, Toronto Star (19 November 2014), online: <thestar.com>.
7
RSO 1990, c C-11, as repealed by Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, SO 2017, c 14,
Schedule 1.
8
Hamilton, supra note 2 at paras 1– 3, 8, 10, 12.
5

3

best interests of the child. On this question, however, the Six Nations Band invoked the
protection of their Aboriginal rights under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,9
heralding a somewhat novel approach, given that this provision had heretofore primarily
been asserted in the context of disputes regarding the lawful application of natural
resource laws to Aboriginal peoples.
Section 35(1) affirms that “[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” Its purpose is to
acknowledge and reconcile the pre-existence of distinctive Indigenous societies with the
sovereignty of the Crown.10 To establish a s. 35(1) right, an applicant must demonstrate
that the activity in question is “an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the
distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right”,11 examined in the context
of “the period prior to contact between aboriginal and European societies”.12 The
applicant must show continuity between the contemporary claimed right and the
pre-contact practice,13 and the court considers how the pre-contact practice supporting the
claim might have evolved to its present-day form.14 An “existing” right is one that was
not extinguished by Parliament prior to the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, the
Crown bearing the burden of establishing a clear and plain intention to extinguish the

9

Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at paras 31, 43, 137 DLR (4th) 289 [Van der Peet].
11
Ibid, at para 46; see also Patrick J Monahan, Constitutional Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) at 496–97;
R v Sappier; R v Gray, 2006 SCC 54 at para 45, [2006] 2 SCR 686 [Sappier; Gray] (“[t]he use of the word
‘distinctive’ as a qualifier is meant to incorporate an element of aboriginal specificity. However,
‘distinctive’ does not mean ‘distinct’”).
12
Van der Peet, supra note 10 at para 60.
13
Ibid at para 63; see also Monahan, supra note 11 at 497.
14
Sappier; Gray, supra note 11 at para 23.
10
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right; furthermore, the phrase “existing aboriginal rights” must be interpreted flexibly so
as to permit the evolution of the rights over time.15
Aboriginal rights protected under s. 35(1) cannot be unilaterally abrogated by the
government.16 Moreover, s. 35 is not located within Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
which contains the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,17 and is consequently not
subject to the limitation under s. 1 of the Charter.18 Nevertheless, Aboriginal rights are
not absolute;19 legislation that interferes with these rights may still be valid if it meets the
justification test laid out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sparrow,20 a test that
functions similarly to the analysis framework for determining whether a Charter violation
can be justified under s. 1.21 If an Aboriginal right is shown to exist, a court asks whether
there has been a prima facie infringement of that right by examining whether the
limitation is unreasonable; whether the regulation imposes undue hardship; and whether
the regulation denies to the holders of the right their preferred means of exercising that
right. If a prima facie infringement is found, the court considers whether the infringement
can be justified. At this point, the Crown must demonstrate, first, that the infringement is
related to a compelling and substantial legislative objective; and, second, that its actions
15

R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 70 DLR (4th) 385 [Sparrow cited to SCR]; see also Delgamuukv v
British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 153 DLR (4th) 193 [Delgamuukv].
16
Mitchell v MNR, 2001 SCC 33 at para 11, [2001] 1 SCR 911 [Mitchell]; Van der Peet, supra note 10
at 28; Sparrow, supra note 15.
17
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11
[Charter].
18
Monahan, supra note 11 at 401, 461; see also Hamilton, supra note 2 at paras 61, 82.
19
Sparrow, supra note 15 at 1109; see also e.g. Monahan, supra note 11 at 465.
20
Sparrow, supra note 15; see also Mitchell, supra note 16 at para 11; Van der Peet, supra note 10 at
para 28.
21
See e.g. Halsbury’s Laws of Canada (online), Aboriginal Law (2016 Reissue) at HAB-129 “Test for
justifying infringement”; Thomas Isaac, “Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: The Challenge of the
Individual and Collective Rights of Aboriginal People” (2002) 21 Windsor YB Access Just 431 at 439
[Isaac, “Individual and Collective Rights of Aboriginal People”]; Joshua Nichols, “Claims of Sovereignty Burdens of Occupation: William and the Future of Reconciliation” (2015) 48 UBC L Rev 221 at 231.
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are consistent with its fiduciary duty with respect to Indigenous peoples, the fulfillment of
which usually requires meaningful consultation and, if appropriate, accommodation.22
Edward J. accordingly began his analysis in Hamilton by examining “whether
D.H.’s decision, as J.J.’s substitute decision-maker, to pursue traditional medicine [was]
in fact an aboriginal right to be recognized and affirmed.”23 On the basis of the evidence
before him, Edward J. held that the Six Nations’ practice of traditional medicine was
integral to its distinctive culture today and that this practice arose during pre-contact
times.24 He affirmed that “D.H.’s decision to pursue traditional medicine for her daughter
J.J. [was] her aboriginal right.”25 He further determined that D.H.’s right to practise
traditional medicine had not been extinguished26 and concluded that J.J. could not be
found to be a child in need of protection when her substitute decision-maker had chosen
to exercise her constitutionally protected right to pursue their traditional medicine over
the hospital’s recommended course of treatment.27
On April 24, 2015, Edward J. issued an “Endorsement,” on a motion by the
Attorney General of Ontario and a joint submission signed by all of the parties.28 In their
joint submission, the parties described how, after the release of the decision on
November 14, 2014, the Government of Ontario chose respectful “dialogue and

22

Sparrow, supra note 15 at 1110; Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73,
[2004] 3 SCR 511; see also e.g. Monahan, supra note 11; Halsbury’s Laws of Canada, supra note 21; John
Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues: Cases, Materials & Commentary (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2018).
23
Hamilton, supra note 2 at para 62.
24
Hamilton, supra note 2 at paras 72–79.
25
Ibid at para 81.
26
Ibid at para 82.
27
Ibid at para 83.
28
Hamilton Health Sciences Corp v DH, 2015 ONCJ 229 [Endorsement].
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co-operation”29 over further litigation, and started working with J.J.’s family “to expand
the integrated health care team for J.J., . . . to provide Indigenous and non-Indigenous
treatment.”30 They further explained that J.J.’s cancer had returned in March 2015 and
that the family had decided to proceed with both chemotherapy and traditional
Haudenosaunee medicine. The parties wished, going forward, to obtain some clarity on
the position of the law, to which end they were asking the Court to elucidate its reasons
given on November 14, 2014, in order to highlight the paramountcy of the best interests
of the child and include the following clarification:
[I]mplicit in this decision is that recognition and implementation of the right to
use traditional medicines must remain consistent with the principle that the best
interests of the child remain paramount. The aboriginal right to use traditional
medicine must be respected, and must be considered, among other factors, in any
analysis of the best interests of the child, and whether the child is in need of
protection.31
After “considering both the facts of this case as expressed by the mother and the history
as it relates to aboriginal peoples,”32 Edward J. concluded that there was “no mischief in
endorsing the joint submission”33 and in recognizing the paramountcy of the best interests
of the child, and accordingly ordered the amendment.34
This subsequent clarification made it clearer to legal observers that Hamilton
remains “in line with parallel freedom of religion cases”,35 the foremost of which is the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of

29

Ibid (Joint Submission of the Parties) [JSP].
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Endorsement, supra note 28 at para 4.
33
Ibid at para 6.
34
Ibid at para 6.
35
Ginn, supra note 5 at 529.
30
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Metropolitan Toronto,36 also examining the constitutionality of state interference with
child-rearing decisions. In that case, baby Sheena’s physicians determined that she might
require a blood transfusion to treat potentially life-threatening congestive heart failure.
Her parents, Jehovah’s Witnesses, objected to blood transfusions for religious reasons,
and the Children’s Aid Society was granted a temporary wardship. The issue before the
Court was whether the Ontario Child Welfare Act37 denied parents a right to choose
medical treatments for their children, contrary to the liberty interest protected by s. 7 of
the Charter; or whether it infringed parents’ freedom of religion as guaranteed
under s. 2(a) of the Charter; and, if so, whether the infringement or infringements were
justifiable under s. 1.38
With regard to the s. 2(a) question, the issue was more specifically the scope of
religious freedom in the context of parental medical decision making.39 La Forest J.,
writing for the majority, held that the right of parents to rear their children according to
their religious beliefs, including that of choosing medical and other treatments, is a
fundamental aspect of freedom of religion. Reiterating Dickson J.’s observations in R. v.
36

Supra note 3.
RSO 1980, c 66, as repealed by Child and Family Services Act, 1984, SO 1984, c 55, s 208.
38
These three provisions read as follows:
1.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.
2.
Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;
....
...
7.
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
[Charter, supra note 17]
39
See also Ciarlariello v Schacter, [1993] 2 SCR 119, [1993] SCJ No 46 (the right to decide what is to be
done to one’s own body is a “concept of individual autonomy [that] is fundamental to the common law”
at 135); Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331; Malette v Shulman, 72 OR
(2d) 417, [1990] OJ No 450 (“people must have the right to make choices that accord with their own values,
regardless of how unwise or foolish those choices may appear to others” at para 19); NB v Hôtel-Dieu de
Québec, [1992] RJQ 361, 86 DLR (4th) 385.
37

8

Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,40 La Forest J. nevertheless clarified that this freedom is not
absolute and may be subject to “such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”. 41 He
concluded that the Child Welfare Act seriously infringed the appellants’ freedom
guaranteed by s. 2(a) to choose medical treatment for their child in accordance with the
tenets of their faith, but that this infringement was justified under s. 1 of the Charter. In
his view, the state interest in protecting children at risk was a pressing and substantial
objective; the process contemplated by the Child Welfare Act was far from arbitrary; and
the restrictions it imposed on parental rights were amply justified.42
The appeal also raised “the more general question of the right of parents to rear
their children without undue interference by the state.”43 Writing for a plurality of the
Court, La Forest J. stated that the s. 7 right to liberty does not protect the integrity of the
family unit as such, since the Charter, and s. 7 in particular, protects individuals.
Moreover, he wrote, “[t]he concept of the integrity of the family unit is itself premised, at
least in part, on that of parental liberty”,44 understood as “a parental right to enjoy family
life and control various aspects of a child’s life, free from unnecessary outside
interference.”45 For him, “the right to nurture a child, to care for its development, and to
make decisions for it in fundamental matters such as medical care, are part of the liberty

40

[1985] 1 SCR 295, 18 DLR (4th) 321 [Big M cited to SCR].
Ibid at 337, cited in B (R), supra note 3 at 368.
42
B (R), supra note 3 at 385–86.
43
Ibid at 363.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid, citing Nicholas Bala & J Douglas Redfearn, “Family Law and the ‘Liberty Interest’: Section 7 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights” (1983) 15 Ottawa L Rev 274 at 281 [emphasis by Bala and Redfearn].
41
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interest of a parent”46 and constitute “an individual interest of fundamental importance to
our society.”47 Indeed, he affirmed, “individuals have a deep personal interest as parents
in fostering the growth of their own children.”48 La Forest J. acknowledged that parents
do bear responsibilities towards their children but stressed that “they must enjoy
correlative rights to exercise them”49 and that to hold otherwise would be to ignore “the
fundamental importance of choice and personal autonomy in our society.”50 In his view,
although children obviously benefit from the protection of the Charter, “we must accept
that parents can, at times, make decisions contrary to their children’s wishes — and rights
— as long as they do not exceed the threshold dictated by public policy”.51
He clarified that state intervention represents a limitation on the constitutional
rights of parents, rather than a vindication of the constitutional rights of children, given
that the Charter serves to protect individuals from the state, not to justify the state’s
limitation of an individual’s rights.52 In any event, these rights must, “under s. 1, be
balanced against the interests of others in a free and democratic society — in this
particular case the right of their child.”53 A balancing exercise similarly occurs in the s. 7
analysis to determine whether the state interference in question conforms to the principles
of fundamental justice.54 Ultimately, La Forest J. held that the Child Welfare Act had
46

B (R), supra note 3 at 370.
Ibid at 371 [emphasis added].
48
Ibid at 372 [emphasis added]. Consequently, the state may intervene only when such action is justified
and necessary to safeguard the child’s autonomy or health (ibid).
49
Ibid at 318.
50
Ibid [emphasis added].
51
Ibid at 373.
52
Ibid. La Forest J. also pointed out that the approach taken in this case resulted largely from the fact that
the sole issue raised was the parents’ assertion “that their constitutional rights” had been infringed (ibid
at 387; emphasis in original).
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid at 374, 388.
47

10

deprived the appellants of their right to decide upon their child’s medical treatment, thus
violating their s. 7 parental liberty interest, but that the procedure required under the Act
did not breach the principles of fundamental justice. The protection of a child’s right to
life and to health is a basic tenet of our legal system, and legislation to that end accords
with the principles of fundamental justice, so long as it also meets the requirements of fair
procedure—which La Forest J. found to be the case.55
The specific rights invoked in each of these two cases differ, although they all act
as constitutional shields protecting parental authority from state interference. But what is
notable is the manner in which the courts in both cases described and conceived of
parental rights, and, in particular, the pervasiveness of individualism in their approaches.
With regard to Hamilton, even though Aboriginal rights may be exercised by individual
members of the relevant community,56 such rights have been characterized by the
Supreme Court of Canada as unique “rights held by a collective and . . . in keeping with
the culture and existence of that group.”57 Yet, overall, Edward J.’s analysis appears to
give greater attention to the mother’s beliefs and choice than to her community and the
communal aspects of the practices in question. The discussion engaged primarily with
D.H.’s faith in her culture and traditional medicines, the constitutional status of her
decision to pursue traditional medicine for J.J., and her right to choose. Edward J.’s
conclusion suggested that the mother’s constitutional right was determinative of the
finding that J.J. was not a child in need of protection.58 The parties’ subsequent joint

55

Ibid at 374–81.
See Gordon Christie, “Law, Theory and Aboriginal Peoples” (2003) 2 Indigenous LJ 67 at 83 [Christie,
“Law”].
57
Sparrow, supra note 15at 1112.
58
Hamilton, supra note 2 at para 54.
56
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submission seemed to further underscore a certain unease or ambiguity created by this
emphasis on D.H., in its request that the reasons explicitly state that “[t]he aboriginal
right to use traditional medicine must be respected, and must be considered, among other
factors, in any analysis of the best interests of the child, and whether the child is in need
of protection.”59
As for B. (R.), La Forest J. mentions the rights and interests of children, but these
references are heavily overshadowed by the prominence accorded to the rights and
interests of parents. La Forest J. clearly stresses the deep personal interest that parents
have in raising their children free of interference—an individual interest of fundamental
importance—while endorsing a focus on parental rights rather than responsibilities, and
accentuating the centrality of choice and personal autonomy in Canadian society.
These two judicial opinions highlight the momentousness of such decisions for
parents who are committed to religious or Indigenous traditional beliefs and practices in
the raising of their children. But these parents may find themselves distinctly unsettled by
the courts’ approaches and perceive a disconnect between the legal conceptualization of
their interests and the way in which they themselves understand and live out their
commitments to their personal aspirations, children, families, religions, traditions, and
cultural communities.
In the remainder of this thesis, I will explain my proposition that the courts’
approaches were the product of the liberal vision grounding Canada’s legal system,
flowing from a socio-historical construct that favours the values and concepts of
individualism, rights, freedom, choice, and autonomy. Definitions of autonomy often
59

JSP, supra note 29 at para 83a) [emphasis added].
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evoke the notion of self-determination and the ability to choose one’s own path. But can
this ideal of self-determination truly apply to a decision that is in many ways
other-determining, even if the “other” is one’s own child? In this situation, what does it
mean for a parent, particularly one committed to religious or Indigenous traditional
practices, to act autonomously? In the following chapter, I will examine liberalism’s
influence on the analyses at issue and the primacy it accords to individualism; I will also
reflect on some of the foundations in family theory for parental authority and give reasons
for tempering strongly individualistic conceptions of such rights. The second half of this
thesis will subsequently be devoted to an exploration of relational theory and the insights
it offers to this discussion.

13

Chapter 3: Liberalism’s Individualistic Conception of Rights
Each of the two judicial opinions, in its own manner, draws attention to concepts
such as rights, freedom, and autonomy, with a focus on individual agency or identity.
This approach is one rooted in liberalism, the core principles of which I will describe in
the following section. I will explore how liberal values and principles are reflected in the
courts’ analyses and explain why I think a strongly individualistic paradigm is inapposite
in the circumstances. I will conclude this third chapter by examining the foundations of
parental authority and advancing further reasons for moving away from such an
individualistic approach in this context.
3.1

Canadian Constitutional Law and Its Liberal Pedigree
Law, explains Winnifred Sullivan, is essentially “cultural discourse and

practice”.60 Canadian law, Gordon Christie specifies, is a cultural “institution built on a
bedrock of liberal values and principles”.61 By extension, Benjamin Berger adds, “the
structure of Canadian constitutionalism is really only the vehicle for the transmission – or
perhaps a symptom – of the more foundationally informing political culture of
liberalism”.62
Just what are these liberal values and principles? Kathleen Mahoney describes
liberalism as having a “penchant for universalist descriptions and neutral, symmetrical,
and abstract principles that do not permit contextualized approaches reflecting the
60

Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Paying the Words Extra: Religious Discourse in the Supreme Court of the
United States (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994) at 6.
61
Christie, “Law”, supra note 56 at 72.
62
Benjamin Berger, Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of Constitutionalism (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2015) at 67. See also e.g. Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in
Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983) at 215: “Law . . . is local knowledge; local not
just as to place, time, class, and variety of issue, but as to accent—vernacular characterizations of what
happens connected to vernacular imaginings of what can.”
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experiences of real people.”63 It is characterized by a number of interconnected core
values: individualism; liberty or freedom (often linked to autonomy and choice); the
private/public distinction and the limits of government intervention (including notions
such as John Stuart Mill’s harm principle); equality; rights; and the rule of law.64
First and foremost, the political culture of liberalism is “deeply committed to the
primacy of the individual.”65 It views individuals as seeking, separately, to fulfill their
personal vision of the good life and choosing freely to enter into relationships with
others.66 The quest for self-fulfillment requires freedom from interference by others,67 the
fear being that “interests individually desired”68 may clash. At its core, liberalism is
profoundly committed “to the goods of autonomy and individual liberty as the mechanism
for human flourishing.”69 As Berger puts it, “[s]elf-realization is the goal, and
autonomous choice is the mechanism.”70
Individual autonomous choices must therefore be protected through the legal
mechanism of rights, considered “[f]undamental to a liberal democracy”.71 Thus, each
individual may remain sovereign over his or her life within this zone of private, protected

63

Kathleen E Mahoney, “The Limits of Liberalism” in Richard F Devlin, ed, Canadian Perspectives on
Legal Theory (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery Publications Limited, 1991) 57 at 60.
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activity, free from intrusion by others and by the state,72 with the condition that “the
private space of one individual ends where the space of another begins.”73 In other words,
one’s freedom is “limited only by the requirement that one does not harm others or
interfere with their similar liberty.”74
Linking together this web of characteristics is the notion of individual autonomy,
considered by some to be the most important of liberalism’s core values.75 Autonomy can
encompass individuality, freedom, choice, and privacy.76 From these many facets,77
Alasdair Maclean distills one core concept of autonomy, derived from its very etymology:
“autonomy literally means self-rule”.78 One of the intrinsic values of the “individual right
of autonomy [is that it] makes self-creation possible. It allows each of us to be responsible
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for shaping our own lives”.79 Our choices make us who we are; we know ourselves best
and normally have our own best interests at heart.80 By extension, to value autonomy is to
also acknowledge that we are not normally best placed to know the true desires and best
interests of others.81 Individualistic autonomy has been described as “rational (or anyway
reasoning) individuals choosing goals and plans and projects for themselves, with those
autonomous individuals then coming together, of their own volition, in pursuit of shared
interests and common goals.”82 This description illustrates what Robert Goodin calls the
“unencumbered self.”83
This idea of “self-determination by an individual self”84 is the most common
manifestation of autonomy. However, liberalism’s public/private distinction also extends
the concept of autonomy to the entire family unit.85 In this context, further versions of
autonomy are possible, including that “of individuals within the family”:86
This way of thinking about autonomy separates out individuals from the family
unit and asks that their interests be considered separately and protected even
against other members of that family unit. This version of autonomy undermines
the other two, in that the individual who is encroaching on the welfare or safety of
another family member can find his autonomy compromised by the state’s
intervention on behalf of the person in danger (on the side of her autonomy as an
individual independent from her place within the patriarchal family). In such
contexts, the family is treated not as an autonomous and separate entity, but
79
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merely as another societal institution subject to regulation and the imposition of
norms generated from the outside.87
As with freedom, autonomy is not limitless, and interference may be justified to
protect others.88 In fact, Martha Fineman observes, “autonomy” is often used to describe
“the relationship between the individual and the state. Autonomy in this regard is
individual freedom from state intervention and regulation, the ability to order one’s
activities independent of state dictates.”89 Berger makes the link between individual
autonomy, choice, privacy, and a negative conception of freedom by noting that, from the
liberal perspective, “[f]reedom is secured when the individual can choose freely, and
liberty inheres in being left alone.”90 Essentially, the liberal approach equates both
autonomy and freedom with choice.
In Canadian law, such is the prevalence of these conceptualizations of rights,
freedom, and autonomy that, in Christie’s opinion, “the political morality of liberalism
supplies the language of everyday legal discourse.”91 The Canadian legal rights paradigm
is built upon “[n]otions of protection from social/legal intrusion, a classical concept of
liberty”,92 Mary Ellen Turpel notes, and thus represents “a highly individualistic and
negative concept of social life based on the fear of attack on one’s ‘private’ sphere.”93
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And, woven throughout the fabric of Canadian constitutionalism, Berger argues, is this
same “liberal political culture of autonomy and choice”.94
In her concurring reasons in R. v. Morgentaler,95 for instance, Wilson J. made the
following connection between the Charter, the right to individual liberty, personal choice,
autonomy, self-realization, and human dignity:96
The idea of human dignity finds expression in almost every right and freedom
guaranteed in the Charter. Individuals are afforded the right to choose their own
religion and their own philosophy of life, the right to choose with whom they will
associate and how they will express themselves, the right to choose where they
will live and what occupation they will pursue. These are all examples of the basic
theory underlying the Charter, namely that the state will respect choices made by
individuals and, to the greatest extent possible, will avoid subordinating these
choices to any one conception of the good life.97
In Wilson J.’s opinion, the right to liberty “grants the individual a degree of autonomy in
making decisions of fundamental personal importance”,98 and guarantees “the freedom of
the individual to develop and realize his potential to the full, to plan his own life to suit
his own character, to make his own choices for good or ill, to be non-conformist,
idiosyncratic and even eccentric — to be, in to-day’s parlance, ‘his own person’ and
accountable as such.”99
Furthermore, in defining the content of the right to liberty, Wilson J. described as
follows the conception of the social individual underpinning the Charter:
An individual is not a totally independent entity disconnected from the society in
which he or she lives. Neither, however, is the individual a mere cog in an
impersonal machine in which his or her values, goals and aspirations are
94
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subordinated to those of the collectivity. The individual is a bit of both. The
Charter reflects this reality by leaving a wide range of activities and decisions
open to legitimate government control while at the same time placing limits on the
proper scope of that control.100
Hester

Lessard

praises

this

description

for

its

“acknowledgement

of

the

interconnectedness of life within community.”101 It was a perspicacious account of the
“self in context”,102 of individuals existing in social relations of interdependence. Yet on
top of this image, Wilson J. jarringly superimposed a framework of property and
boundaries: she insisted that “the rights guaranteed in the Charter erect around each
individual, metaphorically speaking, an invisible fence over which the state will not be
allowed to trespass. The role of the courts is to map out, piece by piece, the parameters of
the fence.”103 It is this dénouement that Lessard criticizes, as “the fence metaphor
presupposes an opposition between individual and community, between subjective
freedom and objectively determinable constraints, between a private sphere of unlimited
choice and a public sphere of obligation.”104 Indeed, Richard Moon points out, the entire
“two-step structure of Charter adjudication assumes a bright line between the protected
right or interest of the individual . . . and the conflicting interests or rights of other
individuals or of the collective”.105 Ultimately, for Lessard, in equating Charter rights
with fences, Wilson J. set forth “the classical liberal equation of freedom with exclusion,
100
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boundaries, and individual sovereignty”.106 The result was that “[t]he category of
‘decisions of fundamental personal importance’ simply [became] another fortress of
individual sovereignty”,107 accentuating autonomy as individuality, independence,
separation, and choice.
In Berger’s assessment, autonomy and choice are now firmly at the heart of the
Supreme Court of Canada’s conception of liberty. 108 In Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of
Wilson Colony,109 having enumerated the Charter values of liberty, human dignity,
equality, autonomy, and democracy, McLachlin C.J. “crowned choice as the first among
equals, stating that ‘[t]he most fundamental of these values . . . is liberty – the right of
choice on matters of religion.’”110 Given the force of those core values, it is unsurprising
to Berger that Canadian constitutionalism also shapes its conception of religion according
to the same mould,111 made up of three crucial and interrelated elements: “(1) religion as
essentially individual, (2) religion as centrally addressed to autonomy and choice, and (3)
religion as private.”112
The Supreme Court’s liberal approach to religion113 is evident as early as
Big M,114 where it was first called upon to define freedom of religion. Linking religion to
individual choice, Dickson J. affirmed that, henceforth, the Charter protects “the right of
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every Canadian to work out for himself or herself what his or her religious obligations, if
any, should be”.115 For Horwitz, this is a “view of religion as belief or choice, and as an
individual rather than a community experience.”116 Further characteristics of “liberal
bias”117 can be found in Dickson J.’s description of the limits to religious freedom,
according to which every person is “free to hold and to manifest whatever beliefs and
opinions his or her conscience dictates, provided inter alia only that such manifestations
do not injure his or her neighbours or their parallel rights to hold and manifest beliefs and
opinions of their own.”118 Later, in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem,119 Iacobucci J.
explained that the Court’s approach “is consistent with a personal or subjective
conception of freedom of religion, one that is integrally linked with an individual’s
self-definition and fulfilment and is a function of personal autonomy and choice, elements
which undergird the right”.120
Berger sees “the legal coming-of-age of a constitutional conception of religion
based on autonomy and choice”121 embodied in McLachlin C.J.’s assertion, in Hutterian
Brethren, that “choice . . . lies at the heart of freedom of religion.”122 It is a judicial legacy
that stretches to the present day, as reflected for instance in Rowe J.’s reasons, concurring
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in the result, in Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University.123 In
discussing s. 2(a), Rowe J. placed a particular “emphasis on the free choice of the
believer”,124 reiterating how “our jurisprudence defines the protection of s. 2(a) as
extending to the freedom of individuals to believe in whatever they choose and to
manifest those beliefs.”125 Although he acknowledged the communal aspect of religion,
he “[underscored] that religious freedom is premised on the personal volition of
individual believers.”126 For him, the protection of s. 2(a) “remains predicated on the
exercise of free will by individuals — namely, the choice of each believer to adhere to the
tenets of his or her faith.”127
La Forest J.’s observations in B. (R.) are consistent with this individualistic vision
of freedom of religion. Lessard writes that “Justice La Forest’s ‘isolated’ view portrays
the individual in a fashion associated with classical liberalism, namely, as an abstract
agent whose happiness consists of the unimpeded pursuit of subjectively defined
preferences.”128 Chief among the liberalism-inspired elements are his characterization of
the parental child-rearing interest as a significant individual and personal interest; his
embrace of parental rights; the homage he paid to the importance of choice and personal
autonomy in Canadian society; and the limits he placed on freedom of religion—namely,
the rights, freedoms, and welfare of others. He also made it clear that the parental liberty

123

Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 [Trinity Western].
Ibid at para 214.
125
Ibid at para 220.
126
Ibid at para 219.
127
Ibid at 220.
128
Hester Lessard et al, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1994-1995 Term” (1996) 7 SCLR (2d)
81 at 120.
124

23

interest of “bringing up, nurturing and caring for a child”129 is “an individual interest of
fundamental importance to our society.”130 It is because of “the fundamental importance
of choice and personal autonomy in our society”131 that parents must be accorded rights in
order to discharge their responsibilities towards their children, rights that are to be
balanced against the interests of others.
In cases like Hamilton, the influence of liberalism may appear less evident,
particularly with regard to the s. 35 analysis. After all, far from being individualistic,
Aboriginal rights are generally described as collective in nature.132 Moreover, the
Supreme Court of Canada has held that these “rights cannot . . . be defined on the basis of
the philosophical precepts of the liberal enlightenment. . . . They arise from the fact that
aboriginal people are aboriginal.”133
Yet the very fact that a Canadian court addresses Indigenous concerns or interests
using the rights paradigm betrays the liberal bias in Canadian law. By its very nature,
Marlee Kline reminds us, “Anglo-Canadian law is liberal in form. It is individualistic and
abstract”.134 Jennifer Nedelsky also points out that “all contemporary systems of
constitutional rights draw on a powerful legacy of liberal political thought in which rights
are associated with a highly individualistic conception of humanity. . . . [T]he
rights-bearing individual may be said to be the basic subject of liberal political
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thought.”135 And because Canadian legal discourse takes place in the language of
liberalism, Christie observes, the translation of Indigenous claims into the framework of
rights effectively liberalizes Indigenous societies.136
Sometimes, these claims are lost in translation and not even recognized as falling
within the scope of Canadian law’s protection, such as in Ktunaxa Nation v. British
Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations).137 That case involved the
Ktunaxa First Nation, whose traditional territories include an area in British Columbia
they call Qat’muk. The Ktunaxa consider Qat’muk a sacred site because it is home to
Grizzly Bear Spirit, a principal spirit within their religious beliefs and cosmology. They
raised concerns that the construction of a ski resort in Qat’muk would drive Grizzly Bear
Spirit from that place, thereby irrevocably impairing their religious beliefs and practices,
and argued that the Minister’s decision to approve that project violated their freedom of
religion guaranteed by s. 2(a), and breached the Crown’s duty to consult and
accommodate their Aboriginal rights under s. 35.
Their appeal was unsuccessful. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held
that their s. 2(a) right had not been violated. Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice
and Rowe J. stated that the Ktunaxa’s “novel claim”138 did not fall within the scope of
s. 2(a), which “protects the freedom to worship”139 but not “the object of beliefs”.140
Furthermore, in their view, the Minister’s decision according to which the Crown had met
135
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its duty to consult and accommodate, under s. 35, was reasonable.141 In concurring
reasons, Moldaver and Côté JJ. agreed that the Minister’s conclusion regarding s. 35 was
reasonable.142 However, they would have found an infringement of s. 2(a), one that was
nevertheless justified under s. 1. They understood from the Ktunaxa’s arguments that the
departure of Grizzly Bear Spirit brought about by the construction of the ski resort would
render the Ktunaxa’s sincerely held religious beliefs devoid of all religious significance
and prevent them from acting in accordance with those beliefs, thus infringing their right
to religious freedom.143 Moldaver and Côté JJ. explained that the principle of state
neutrality required that “courts must be alive to the unique characteristics of each religion,
and the distinct ways in which state action may interfere with that religion’s beliefs or
practices.”144 The justices recognized how Indigenous religions may differ from
Judeo-Christian faiths in the belief that land itself may be sacred, such that state action
that affects that land can interfere with the ability to act in accordance with religious
beliefs and practices.145
The outcome in Ktunaxa seems to bear out Borrow’s declaration that “law is a
liberal god that creates religion in its own image.”146 Despite the fact that the Ktunaxa’s
claim was translated into the language of Canadian constitutionalism, the majority’s
141
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narrow delineation of the freedom to believe meant that the Constitution was of no help to
the Ktunaxa.147 Lori Beaman has argued that the narrow legal construction of what counts
and should be protected as religious freedom in Canada is dominated by a mainstream
Christian hegemony. As a result, Indigenous notions of spirituality, particularly those
relating to sacred natural spaces and referenced in collective terms, fail to find a legal
foothold.148 In Ktunaxa, even s. 35 did not live up to its potential, as identified by
Borrows, “for recognizing and affirming [Indigenous] spiritual beliefs and practices”,149
and ultimately also had “difficulty travelling beyond its own cultural commitments.”150
Borrows further points out that, like those rights that “flow from the liberal
enlightenment . . . [Aboriginal rights] likewise exist to restrain government action.”151
Otherwise put, s. 35 similarly operates to “[shield] native forms of life from federal or
provincial intrusion”.152 Moreover, owing to the trajectory of the s. 35 case law,
Aboriginal rights, although “described as collective,”153 are “individualizable”.154 Christie
explains that “[m]uch of the litigation over Aboriginal and treaty rights has involved
traditional practices such as hunting and fishing”.155 In these cases, “while the right is
held by communities, it is exercised by individual members of the community. Such
rights can be contrasted to other collective rights, such as language rights, held by the
147
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group and only exercisable collectively.”156 More specifically, however, Aboriginal rights
entail not only the (individualizable) right to engage in particular activities but also the
relevant community’s “right to regulate and control (or govern) the manner in which
those activities are carried out.”157
In a case like Hamilton involving Aboriginal rights, liberal idiosyncrasies feature
less prominently than with a s. 2(a) analysis, and liberalism’s potential for strong
individualism is tempered. Notably, even though Edward J. made apparent the
individualizable nature of s. 35 in his discussion of the mother’s choice to exercise her
right, he also indicated that the Six Nations Band had invoked the application of s. 35(1),
participated throughout the proceedings, and supported D.H. and her family.158
Yet certain aspects of liberalism can still be discerned. First and foremost, the
legal framework and discourse employed, and the resolution of the debate through rights
claimed against the state, are derivations of that political culture. This “liberalization” of
Indigenous claims occurs despite objections that the rights paradigm is alien to the
traditions of most Indigenous cultures.159 Furthermore, First Nations groups also dispute
the legitimacy of the Canadian state’s jurisdictional authority over their family law and
child and family services.160
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Also of note in Hamilton are the references to concepts such as choice, personal
commitment, and belief. Edward J. pointed to D.H.’s “strong faith in her native
culture”161 and highlighted the fact that she was “deeply committed to her longhouse
beliefs and her belief that traditional medicines work.”162 Her choice was to be respected
and not subordinated to any one philosophy, in particular “the western medical
paradigm.”163 Edward J. considered that D.H. had the right to decide to practise those
beliefs as J.J.’s substitute decision-maker164 and concluded that he could not “find that J.J.
[was] a child in need of protection when her substitute decision-maker [had] chosen to
exercise her constitutionally protected right”.165
Last but not least was the relative abstractness of the analysis, to the extent that
the evaluation of whether J.J. was a child in need of protection and the assessment of her
best interests seemed to explicitly take into account only her mother’s choice to exercise
her constitutional right. The parties’ subsequent proposed clarification more clearly
contextualized that right, by placing it “among other factors . . . [to be considered] in any
analysis of the best interests of the child, and whether the child is in need of
protection.”166
In the next section, I will explain why these approaches proceeding from the
liberal heritage should be recalibrated so that conceptions of rights that focus
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disproportionately on individuality may better account for the relational side of human
nature, and so that abstract perspectives may give way to more contextualized ones.
3.2

Arguments for a More Balanced, Contextual Approach to Religious and
Aboriginal Rights
To varying degrees, the interests at play in the cases discussed above were treated

one-dimensionally or a-contextually. But even though individualism and abstraction may
both be associated with the genealogy of liberalism, they are not inevitable. As Nedelsky
points out, “[t]he best understandings of the nature of the human self and the way rights
function are on the side of a realignment of the liberal tradition. Human beings are both
uniquely individual and essentially social creatures. The liberal tradition has been not so
much wrong as seriously and dangerously one-sided in its emphasis.”167 Additional
nuance and contextualism seems desirable as a general rule in legal discourse, and surely
so where the issues concern profoundly significant religious, spiritual, or traditional
values.
The way in which legal actors conceptualize religion, in all its complexity,
matters. As McLachlin C.J. observed, constitutional documents embody “the values that
capture the ethos of the nation.”168 With regard to the Charter, Lori Beaman reminds us
that it “is an important symbol of the way in which Canada, as a liberal democracy,
encapsulates the public expression of values and norms. As with all symbols, though,
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meaning and interpretation are fluid. It is the process of its interpretation that offers a
window into the boundaries of religious freedom and reveals power relations.”169 In
Beaman’s opinion, “to describe the rights and freedoms articulated in the Charter as
‘individual’ is problematic and misses the relational aspect of social life”.170
Religion is both deeply personal and “eminently social”.171 Religion is lived,
Robert Orsi asserts, and “[l]ived religion cannot be separated from other practices of
everyday life, . . . or from other cultural structures and discourses (legal, political,
medical, and so on).”172 Religious beliefs and practices foster connections with other
individuals and communities. They function, in Orsi’s words, “as media of engagement
with the world.”173
Lessard notes that Charter analysis has in fact accommodated a strong “counter
theme of community”, despite its “indebtedness to the individualist focus of
liberalism”.174 Indeed, she writes, “[t]he vision of the individual person within Canadian
constitutional discourse often presumes the social and communal aspect of
self-determination and fulfillment”175—as illustrated by Wilson J.’s comment in
Operation Dismantle v. R.176 that “[t]he concept of ‘right’ as used in the Charter
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postulates the inter-relation of individuals in society”.177 In Hutterian Brethren, LeBel J.
delivered dissenting reasons that regarded religious relationships and communities of
faith as important aspects of religion.178 Also dissenting, Abella J. observed “that freedom
of religion has ‘both individual and collective aspects’”,179 a statement with which the
majority concurred.180 The majority acknowledged that “[r]eligion is a matter of faith,
intermingled with culture. It is individual, yet profoundly communitarian.”181 In Loyola
High School v. Quebec (Attorney General),182 Abella J. again referred to “both the
individual and collective aspects of religious belief”183 and stated that “[r]eligious
freedom under the Charter must therefore account for the socially embedded nature of
religious belief, and the deep linkages between this belief and its manifestation through
communal institutions and traditions”.184 More recently, in Trinity Western, the majority
noted that “[f]reedom of religion protects the rights of religious adherents to hold and
express beliefs through both individual and communal practices.”185 Citing those earlier
observations in Hutterian Brethren and Loyola, the majority held that “[a]lthough this
Court’s interpretation of freedom of religion reflects the notion of personal choice and
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individual autonomy and freedom, religion is about both religious beliefs and religious
relationships”.186
Richard Moon points out that because religion “ties the individual to a community
of believers and is often the central or defining association in his life”,187 the Supreme
Court of Canada has treated religion in equality decisions as “a personal characteristic
that is [constructively] immutable or changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal
identity.”188 For Moon, this melding of personal commitment and cultural (or communal)
identity stems from the dyadic nature of religion:
While religious commitment or belief is sometimes described as a personal choice
or judgment made by the individual that is in theory revisable (individuals
convert, lose their faith, and are born again), it is also, or sometimes instead,
described as a central element of the individual’s identity. I suggest that the
significance or value of religion, from a public perspective, may depend on “its
dual character – as both a commitment ... to certain truths or values and a deeply
rooted part of her cultural identity.”189
Freedom of religion therefore implicates not only the individual but also the
community and public.190 This is the “relational quality of freedoms”,191 one that poses

186

Ibid at para 64.
Richard Moon, “Freedom of Conscience and Religion” (2013) 61 SCLR 2(d) 339 at 341 [Moon,
“Freedom of Conscience and Religion”].
188
Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 SCR 203 at para 13, 173 DLR
(4th) 1.
189
Richard Moon, “Introduction: Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada” in Richard Moon, ed, Law and
Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 1 at 18 [emphasis in original]; see also e.g.
Moon, “Freedom of Conscience and Religion”, supra note 187 at 412. But see Berger, supra note 62 at 87:
When one moves to the next question about why we want to protect individuals from
identity-based mistreatment or harm, the answer collapses the focus back onto conceptions of
autonomy and choice. Just as the “identity” aspect of equality is often eclipsed by the concept of
choice, the quality/identity aspect of religion is ultimately little more than a marker for a
particularly valued manifestation of choice. In both cases – in equality and in religion – law’s
central concern is to treat the individual fairly as an autonomous choosing agent. Identity itself is
valued because it is an expression of who the subject wants to be and to become; identity, on this
view, is a function of choice.
190
These categories of private/public, individual/community with regard to religion are also “modernist
divisions”: Beaman, Defining Harm, supra note 169 at 105. Beaman further reminds us that “even those
‘private’ moments in religious practice are, in some measure, public and connected”: ibid at 105.
187

33

challenges for the s. 1 analysis: as Beaman explains, “if constitutional rights protect
something more than individual liberty, if they protect the individual’s connection or
relationship with others, and are about the realization of self within community,
judgments about their scope and limits may involve complex and economic
considerations.”192
This complexity may go some way to explaining the sense of dissatisfaction193
that arises when decisions like B. (R.) oversimplify the analysis by presenting only the
individual aspect of religious freedom. Horwitz for instance levies the following criticism
against Iacobucci and Major JJ.’s view of religion as individual choice: “The result may
be appropriate, by liberal standards; but it offers little consolation to religious families
whose understanding of religion is as social in nature as it is individual, and who believe
that God will judge their child according to its conduct, regardless of whether the child
has made an autonomous choice.”194
The emphasis on individual choice may appear to simplify matters, but of course
these are hard cases, ones that Moon says “reflect our ambivalence about parental
‘rights’, and more deeply our complex understanding of religion as both a matter of
cultural identity and personal judgment.”195 On the one hand, we may think it important
to accord parents a degree of autonomy over the upbringing of their children as a matter
of cultural preservation; on the other, “we also recognize that children who are denied
necessary medical treatment because of their parents’ religious beliefs, [may] never reach
191
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an age at which they may be able to make their own judgments.”196 Thus, Moon
concludes, “the debate about religious freedom in the family context exposes most starkly
the central tension in the courts’ understanding of religion as both a personal commitment
and a cultural identity, and of religious freedom as either the right of the individual to
make spiritual choices or the right of religious believers or communities to be treated with
equal respect.”197
Moreover, Shauna Van Praagh argues, such debates involve “not only a situation
of ‘parents of faith,’. . . but also one of ‘children of faith’.”198 That is to say, community
membership is a crucial component in the lives of families and children; when children
are brought up among communities of shared heritage, faith, or culture, “[t]he beliefs,
spirituality, and connection to the sacred of these children are firmly integrated into their
sense of self, agency and responsibility.”199 These community ties may enrich children’s
lives, just as they may also inflict harm, and they merit consideration in any assessment of
a child’s welfare.200
Berger has shown how this singular focus on choice and the individual can be
traced back to the foundations of Canadian constitutionalism and the law’s ideological
commitments to those very values.201 The resulting rendering of religion by law is one
that “has deep sympathies with certain Protestant understandings”. 202 As evidenced by
Ktunaxa, a narrow legal construction of religion singling out “the individual,
196

Ibid at 414.
Ibid at 412.
198
Van Praagh, “Faith”, supra note 193 at 165.
199
Ibid at 176 [footnotes omitted].
200
Ibid at 165. Van Praagh extends her call for a richer portrayal of families and communities to other
cultural communities, including First Nations: ibid at 165–66.
201
Berger, supra note 62 at 100.
202
Ibid at 101.
197

35

choice-centred, and private dimensions of human life”203 increases the risk of conflict
between law and religious cultures that deviate from this particular mould.204 Such
conflicts, Berger argues, can create significantly “negative impacts upon the very issue it
seeks to resolve: the challenge of religious pluralism within liberal constitutionalism.”205
Although the law treats as analytically distinct the parental right to religious
freedom in B. (R.) and the Aboriginal right to pursue traditional healing practices in
Hamilton, there are conceptual affinities between the two interests and the way in which
jurists have envisioned their nature and value. The previous discussion on religious
beliefs and practices, and how they permeate all aspects of an adherent’s life and identity,
likely strikes a familiar chord with parents such as D.H. who are deeply “committed
traditional longhouse believers who integrate their culture into their day-to-day living”206,
who have a “strong faith in [their] native culture”,207 and whose “longhouse adherence is
who they are”.208 Scholars like Moon, Van Praagh, and Bruce Ryder have recognized
“that religious belief and affiliation are fundamental aspects of one’s identity, [and are]
closely connected to cultural membership.”209 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada
has underscored the importance of the intergenerational transmission of Indigenous
cultures and practices, notably in R. v. Côté.210 Many of the attributes associated with
religious beliefs and practices, including the significance they hold for both “parents of
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faith” and “children of faith;” the ties they nurture between individual practitioners and
larger communities; and the role they play in sustaining the vitality of these communities,
may well resonate with adherents of traditional Indigenous practices.
Like Berger, Christie observes that the issues the law deals with “are essentially
problems it can define in liberal terms.”211 When these issues involve Indigenous
concerns, the law converts them into problems defined and resolved using the language
and structure of liberal theory.212 The difficulty for Christie is that many of the premises
regarding human nature that undergird liberal theory are incompatible with Indigenous
world views.213 Among the differences he points to are the fact that “Aboriginal peoples
live within belief-systems that prioritize the community over individuals”;214 the fact that
“[r]esponsibilities act to define a core of the identity of the [Aboriginal] individual, just as
the existence of a society centred around responsibilities defines the identity of
Aboriginal communities”;215 and the fact the “[r]easons liberal theorists advance for
structuring society around the notion of a ‘context of choice’ are absent in Aboriginal
communities.”216 Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long describe the Indigenous conception
of individuals within society “as cosmocentric rather than homocentric”, 217 a perspective
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that embraces the premise of “the interrelatedness of all life”, 218 not just human lives,
such that “[w]ithin this encompassing web of social relations the individual is
characterized as the repository of responsibilities rather than as a claimant of rights.”219
Christie therefore asserts that the liberal foundation of Canadian law, with its formative
vision of the autonomous individual in pursuit of the good life,220 has difficulty
accommodating either Indigenous philosophies or the collective nature of Aboriginal
rights.221
The very concept of rights is a large factor in the “cultural dissonance”222 dividing
Canadian constitutionalism and Indigenous cultures. Turpel argues that “[t]he rights
paradigm . . . is simply a historically and culturally specific mechanism for the resolution
of disputes and the allocation of resources which is different from the procedures used in
any of the various Aboriginal cultures.”223 It is, in her view, a regime that projects the
law’s “cultural imagery”224 and that stands in diametrical opposition to the philosophies
of First Nations Peoples.225 The filtering of Indigenous concerns through the framework
of liberal rights creates tensions between Indigenous world views and the “discourses of
the state – discourses that are used to express the meaning and content of Aboriginal
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rights, sovereignty, and nationhood”,226 using the language of “[t]he generic
individualism of liberal political theory”.227
Interwoven with such criticisms are objections concerning the application of
individualistic values to Indigenous collective claims and interests.228 Boldt and Long
explain that when Indigenous communities invoke “constitutional protection from abuse
by the larger society, they believe their security lies in laws protecting their collective
rights, not their individual rights.”229 In particular, they “assert that the doctrine of
individualism and inherent inalienable rights . . . is not part of their cultural heritage,
serves no positive purpose for them, and threatens their integrity and survival as a unique
people.”230
Nevertheless, not all Indigenous legal scholars and actors take the position that
individual rights have no place within their societies.231 Isaac writes that “the notion of
reconciling individual rights with group rights is not without support and understanding
226
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within the Aboriginal community.”232 In particular, Indigenous feminist scholars and
activists have pressed for an approach that adequately addresses “the needs and concerns
of Indigenous women at the intersection of individual and collective rights.”233 They see
collective and individual rights as interrelated and mutually reinforcing, given that a
group’s collective subsistence depends on the well-being and survival of its individual
members, and vice versa.234
Objections to a-contextual, isolationist approaches have also been raised with
regard to the concept of autonomy as it applies to First Nations. For instance, Benedict
Kingsbury cautions against theories of legal relations among sovereign states that are
“grossly disconnected from economic, political and social relations as they existed in
practice.”235 In reality, he writes, almost all “autonomy regimes which indigenous peoples
operate or aspire to . . . presuppose extensive relations between the autonomous
institutions and other government institutions of the state, and between indigenous people
and other people within or outside the autonomous area.”236 Kingsbury concludes that the
true focus of autonomy is on relationships and how they are to be defined.237 In the same
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vein, Fiona MacDonald urges us to recognize that “[t]he realities of multinational
societies and an increasingly globalized world undermine”238 any attempt to conceive of
autonomy “in an either/or, zero-sum fashion”.239 Her position is that “[a]lthough
indigenous ‘groups’ are distinct nations, they remain embedded in unavoidable
relationships of all kinds with Canadian governments.”240
In response to the charge that Indigenous concerns cannot be construed or
resolved using the language and construct of Canadian law, I offer no ready answer or
alternative within the confines of this thesis. Nevertheless, I rely on the idea, expressed as
I understand it by authors such as Manley-Casimir and Turpel, that the path towards
post-colonialism will not be a short one and will be established through many
interlocking actions.241 In the hopes of contributing to that larger conversation, I venture
only to suggest that it would be appropriate, at the very least, to curtail any proclivity the
liberal legal tradition may have for being, in Nedelsky’s words, “dangerously one-sided in
its emphasis.”242
Before I move on to a discussion of relational theory and how it may contribute to
a more nuanced analysis of the issues at hand, I would like to address one last point—
namely, the “parental” aspect of these rights. In the present context, I identified as
incongruous conceptions of autonomy that seem to lean heavily towards the abstract or
238
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individualistic; yet that appraisal begs the question of whether there is something about
parental rights in particular that might dictate such an approach. Consequently, in the
following section, I will examine family theory and the justifications for parental
child-rearing rights found in the legal traditions relied upon by Canadian courts in cases
like B. (R.) and Hamilton.
3.3

Foundations of Parental Authority
Canada, according to the Supreme Court, “is a diverse and multicultural society,

bound together by the values of accommodation, tolerance and respect for
diversity.”243 Some parental discretion in child rearing is thought to be a necessary
corollary of the commitment made by liberal democracies to cultural and religious
diversity, pluralism, and liberty:244 “[t]he pluralism indissociable from a democratic
society . . . depends on”245 freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; it “allows
communities with different values and practices to peacefully co-exist”.246 Brenda Hale
posits that “[t]he whole idea that people are ‘born free and equal in dignity and rights’ is
premised on difference. If we were all the same, we would not need to guarantee that
individual differences should be respected.”247 This diversity is sustained when members
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of different communities are able to pass on their beliefs to their children and when
families are allowed to bring up their children in their own way.248
But this notion of parental rights is neither a-cultural nor incontrovertible. Debates
like Hamilton and B. (R.) brought before Canadian courts take place specifically within
the Western-liberal doctrine of human individual rights, a doctrine that developed in
response to particular historical, political, and socio-economic circumstances within
European states.249 Even within the common law tradition itself, the notion of rights
specifically accorded to parents is contentious. In comparing parental rights to other
individual rights, a number of authors have concluded that child-rearing rights are
aberrant and generally inconsistent with legal principles. James Dwyer, for instance,
argues that the very fact that parents enjoy rights to control others is an anomaly and
represents “the sole exception to the general rule that rights in our legal system are
limited to self-determining safeguards, choices, and activities.”250 Otherwise put,
“[o]utside the context of child rearing, the law and public morality categorically reject the
notion that any individual is ever entitled to control the life of another person, free from
outside interference, no matter how intimate the relationship between them.”251 As Dwyer
sees it, rather than be given child-rearing rights, parents should simply be “permitted to
carry out parental duties and make certain decisions on a child’s behalf in accordance
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with rights of the child.”252 This debate raises some fundamental questions: Where do
such concepts of parental rights come from, and what is their scope? The answers, it
appears, are not without ambiguity or controversy.
Jeffrey Blustein explains that in Western philosophical thought, “[t]he history of
philosophy of the family is complex for a number of reasons.” 253 Notably, the
conceptions of family, duty, and familial relationships have differed throughout the ages
and received varying degrees of attention, with children and their rights only very
recently coming increasingly to the forefront.254 Furthermore, as Andrew Hall indicates,
“controversy about parental rights is also a function of historical social change”, 255 with
significant developments occurring in Western democracies over the last fifty years. Hall
points to the common perception “that since approximately the mid-nineteenth century,
we have been moving from a paradigm of the family that is so deferential to parental
authority that children are treated almost like a form of property to one that is
child-centered and is highly solicitous of children’s independent interests and rights
against their parents.”256 Such rights include protection from abuse, exploitation, and
neglect, whereby the state assumes the role of parens patriae.257

252

Ibid [emphasis in original].
Jeffrey Blustein, Parents and Children: The Ethics of the Family (New York: Oxford University Press,
1982) at 20 [Blustein, Parents and Children].
254
Ibid at 21.
255
Andrew Justus Hall, Origins and Departures: Childhood in the Liberal Order (PhD Thesis, Columbia
University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2011) (New York: Columbia University, 2011) at 220.
256
Ibid.
257
Ibid.
253

44

For Samantha Godwin, current debates in this field feature a clash between the
“children’s liberation position”258 and the “child protectionist position,” the latter view
holding that children lack the rationality and maturity to make important decisions and
need competent adults to care for them;259 under this view, children’s rights are mostly
conceptualized “in terms of what children need in order to develop successfully.” 260 It is
this second position that dominates in academia; it is also the one endorsed in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child261 and favoured by the Supreme Court of
Canada. It is a legal arrangement “widely believed to have its basis in a parent’s ‘natural
rights’”,262 whereby parents have guardianship and decision-making authority by default
over their children at birth.263 Nevertheless, the scope of such presumably “natural” rights
is, as Samantha Godwin observes, “necessarily a matter of government policy and judicial
recognition.”264 Parenting and laws thereon are essentially cultural constructs.265
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This vision of family intimacy and parental authority in Anglo-American law
dates back to the Roman Empire and the concept of patria potestas, “a proprietary,
magisterial and arbitrary power belonging to the father as pater familias.”266 With the
advent of the early modern period and European philosophers such as Bodin through to
Locke, a prolonged discussion ensued regarding the nature and justification of parental
and political power, as well as the relation between the two.267 The 1680 publication of
Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha, defending the doctrine of the divine rights of
monarchy,268 further fueled the debate surrounding parental authority.269 Filmer’s theory
was that royal power and “fatherly right” were both divinely granted. 270 This patriarchal
justification of the duty to obey the state resonated with English political scholars at the
time in part because “[t]he seventeenth-century English family ‘was indeed an
authoritarian institution that was well-suited to be the basis of an absolutist political
doctrine . . .’.”271 Correlatively, the reverse analogy could also be made: “While the king
claimed paternal authority, fathers claimed to be kings of their domains”.272 Musing on
this subject in his Two Treatises to Government and relying on theology, Locke rejected
the idea that parents own their children, since “human beings may not use one another as
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mere means.”273 Later secular versions of this argument, such as the one put forth by
Rawls, presume “that human beings are morally equal in virtue of their common
capacities to act rationally and reasonably, which is to say their capacities to pursue their
own good and to act in accordance with moral principle.”274 Children, it was argued,
enjoy the same basic moral status because they are endowed with the potential for
rationality.275
In Canada, the Supreme Court has affirmed that “the law no longer treats children
as the property of those who gave them birth”.276 Nevertheless, Andrew Hall is joined by
a number of others in suggesting that the proprietary nature of parental rights has never
truly been abandoned.277 Notably, he explains, “[p]arents . . . continue to hold rights, not
only against their children, but against third parties. And in that sense—as rights in rem
over something external—parental rights do resemble property rights more than most
other rights with which we are now familiar.”278
However, an alternative conception of parental rights also endures, namely,
Locke’s highly influential fiduciary model. For Locke, the father’s absolute power was
linked “to the performance of parental duty”.279 More specifically, Hall writes, “Locke’s
rather elegant strategy is to argue that the child’s undeveloped potential for reason is at
once the basis of the child’s moral equality with his parents and the basis for his
273
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temporary subjection to their authority.”280 According to both Locke and Pufendorf, the
birthright of children is to attain the state of full equality and reason, and certain adults
have a duty to help them reach this state; parental rights over children are simply the
means for fulfilling these duties.281 Thus, Locke contrasts the notion of government
against the idea of parental rights as property rights: “[g]overnment . . . is not a private
right, but a fiduciary trust”,282 whereby power is exercised for the good of the governed
(children), who also have rights against their parents.283 In fact, as Hall observes, “Locke
insists that, ‘to speak properly,’ the rights of parents over minor children are ‘rather the
privilege of children, and the duty of parents, than any prerogative of paternal power’”.284
However, Locke and Pufendorf both stipulate that parents have no general obligation to
always sacrifice their own rights and interests for the sake of their children.285 This
justification of parental autonomy as a means of ensuring children’s welfare (rather than
as a reflection of the respect due to parents per se) is an approach taken by authors such
as Elaine Chiu, Katherine Bartlett, Janet Leach Richards, and Joseph Goldstein.286
The Supreme Court of Canada seems to have adopted this fiduciary theory to a
certain extent. In M. (K.) v. M. (H.),287 La Forest J. wrote that “[i]t is intuitively apparent
that the relationship between parent and child is fiduciary in nature”.288 Observing that
“society has imposed upon parents the obligation to care for, protect and rear their
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children”,289 he held that “[t]he inherent purpose of the family relationship imposes
certain obligations on a parent to act in his or her child’s best interests, and a presumption
of fiduciary obligation arises.”290 Later, in K.L.B., McLachlin C.J. revisited the issue of
parental fiduciary duty and made it clear that “[p]arents should try to act in the best
interests of their children.”291 In explaining why a failure to meet this goal could
nevertheless not be an independent ground of liability at common law or equity, the Chief
Justice drew attention to the complex nature of parental decision making:
It is often unclear at the time which, among all of the possible actions that a parent
could perform, will best advance a child’s best interests. Different parents have
different ideas of what particular actions or long-term strategies will accomplish
this, all of which may be reasonable. And even once parents do sort this out, they
may face the practical difficulty that what they can do for their children is limited
by their resources, their energy, their abilities and the competing needs of their
other children.292
Authors like Lainie Friedman Ross seem to fall in line with this view of parental
fiduciary duty. In her view, “[w]hile the needs and interests of children ought to be
central to the goals of the parents, to hold that the needs and interests of children must be
given absolute priority at all times and in all circumstances is untenable.”293 She offers a
model of parental autonomy whereby parents “have the freedom to consider their own
needs and interests provided that they have ensured for the provision of their child’s basic
289

Ibid at 62.
Ibid at 65. In that case, involving an action against a father for incest, La Forest J. described the parental
fiduciary duty narrowly as “simply to refrain from inflicting personal injuries upon one’s child” (ibid at 67).
291
KLB v British Columbia, 2003 SCC 51 at para 44, [2003] 2 SCR 403 [KLB].
292
Ibid at para 46. In McLachlin C.J.’s view, “concern for the best interests of the child informs the
parental fiduciary relationship” (ibid at para 49). More specifically, “the duty imposed is to act loyally, and
not to put one’s own or others’ interests ahead of the child’s in a manner that abuses the child’s trust” (ibid
at para 49). In another case, the Chief Justice wrote that “[t]he cases on the parental fiduciary duty focus not
on achieving what is in the child’s best interest, but on specific conduct that causes harm to children in a
manner involving disloyalty, self-interest, or abuse of power — failing to act selflessly in the interests of
the child.” [EDG v Hammer, 2003 SCC 52 at para 23, [2003] 2 SCR 459]
293
Lainie Friedman Ross, Children, Families, and Health Care Decision Making (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1998) at 21 [emphasis in original].
290

49

needs.”294 Otherwise put, “[p]arental rights . . . accord parents certain freedoms and
powers derived from their status as parents (i.e. the freedom to raise their children
according to their own conception of the good life) as well as the rights to fulfill their
non-parental interests”,295 as long as they meet the threshold minimum of the child’s basic
needs.
Others, like Dwyer and Page, are critical of what Page calls “the argument from
necessity,”296 according to which parents need rights to carry out their child-rearing
responsibilities; it is an argument that fails, in their opinion, to account for the expansive
scope of parental discretion and rights.297 Furthermore, Dwyer argues, “[t]he fact that one
person owes duties to another person certainly does not logically entail that the first
person has any rights—not even rights that might be necessary to fulfill her duties.”298
Rights of office or fiduciary rights do not exist for the sake of the rights-holder, but rather
allow the latter such freedom or authority as is necessary to discharge that person’s
obligations; these are what Andrew Hall terms “operational rights.”299 Ultimately, Hall
concludes, “the fiduciary account fails to do justice to the notion that parents have
fundamental individual rights—rights in their own name, not just rights of office—to
raise their children.”300
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The Supreme Court does appear to contemplate something more than mere
operational rights. La Forest J. seemed to suggest as much in B. (R.) when he described
“parental liberty” as “a parental right to enjoy family life and control various aspects of a
child’s life, free from unnecessary outside interference.”301 This parental interest, he
wrote, “is an individual interest of fundamental importance to our society”,302 and
“individuals have a deep personal interest as parents in fostering the growth of their own
children.”303 Parents must be accorded rights to fulfill their responsibilities towards their
children because of “the fundamental importance of choice and personal autonomy in our
society.”304
In Godbout v. Longueuil (City),305 La Forest J., writing for L’Heureux-Dubé and
McLachlin JJ., reiterated the view that the decisions of parents respecting their children’s
medical care fell within a narrow class of “matters that can properly be characterized as
fundamentally or inherently personal such that, by their very nature, they implicate basic
choices going to the core of what it means to enjoy individual dignity and
independence.”306 Such decisions are “quintessentially private decision[s] going to the
very heart of personal or individual autonomy.”307
In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.),308
Lamer C.J. cited La Forest J.’s affirmation in B. (R.) that the parental interest in raising
and caring for a child is “an individual interest of fundamental importance in our
301
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society”.309 Lamer C.J. added that the parent-child relationship is “a private and intimate
sphere”310 and that “an individual’s status as a parent is often fundamental to personal
identity”.311 And, finally, in Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission),312
Bastarache J. listed the right to raise one’s children among the interests that are the most
compelling and basic to individual autonomy and dignity.313
Therefore whereas the narrower notion of operational rights may be less
objectionable, the more contentious idea that parents have some personal, fundamental
child-rearing right persists. Some academic commentators like William Galston maintain
that parents are not mere caretakers, that there is something special about the parent-child
relationship, and that there is a particular significance to “raising one’s children, and
raising them in a particular way”.314 Such views of parenthood fit uneasily with the
fiduciary account of parental rights.315 Importantly, Andrew Hall notes, the fiduciary
paradigm fails to recognize “the personal stake that parents possess in having an intimate
relationship with their children. The nature of that relationship, it will be argued, is very
different from the sort of relationship a public office-holder has with the public, and it
constitutes so fundamental an interest that it does make sense to say that parents have an
individual right to rear their children.”316 From this point of view, parents have a
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profound and valid interest in establishing and maintaining an intimate relationship with
their children, provided that the children’s basic needs are met.317 These perspectives,
Hall writes, are among a number of “contemporary intimacy-based accounts of parental
rights.”318
Defending such an account, Ferdinand Schoeman argues that “moral and social
philosophy have concentrated almost exclusively on abstract relationships among people,
emphasizing either individual autonomy or general social well-being, [while] certain key
aspects of our moral experience—those aspects [that] deal with intimate relationships—
have been virtually ignored.”319 For Schoeman, intimate relationships define individuals;
require privacy and autonomy to thrive;320 and bring meaning to one’s existence because
of “the personal commitments to others which are constitutive of such relationships.”321
Brighouse and Swift add to this narrative by describing the parent-child
relationship as a “distinctive moral burden”.322 It is distinctive, Hall explains, because
“being a parent requires the development and exercise of capacities that are not called for
by any other pursuit and which open up possibilities of self-discovery that are unavailable
in any other relationship.”323 Brighouse and Swift conclude that the “challenge of
parenting is something adults have an interest in facing, and it is that interest that grounds
317
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fundamental parental rights over their children”.324 But these rights, they specify, are
conditional and limited: they are justified only to the extent necessary to protect the
special parent-child relationship.325 They propose two types of operational rights in this
context: those that allow parents to ensure their children’s interests, and those that allow
parents to maintain an intimate relationship with their children.326 The latter, termed
“associational rights,”327 are contingent upon the child’s basic needs being satisfied. As
long as parents meet this threshold, they “are not under an obligation to be considering
the child’s best interests as they exercise these rights”.328 Where it is determined that the
threshold has not been met, the “right of parental autonomy”329 may be limited by the
state, which, as parens patriae, “shares the tasks of parenting with individual parents”330
and has an “interest in protecting the welfare of children”.331 Individual parents outrank
the state in the hierarchy,332 and “courts evaluate the parens patriae actions of the state
against the privileged place of parents.”333
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The Supreme Court of Canada seems to appreciate the value of the parent-child
relationship, for both parents and children. In Hepton et al. v. Maat,334 for instance,
Rand J. recognized the child’s interest in remaining within his or her family:
As parens patriae the Sovereign is the constitutional guardian of children, but that
power arises in a community in which the family is the social unit. . . . The
controlling fact in the type of case we have here is that the welfare of the child can
never be determined as an isolated fact, that is, as if the child were free from
natural parental bonds entailing moral responsibility—as if, for example, he were
a homeless orphan wandering at large.
The view of the child’s welfare conceives it to lie, first, within the warmth and
security of the home provided by his parents; when through a failure, with or
without parental fault, to furnish that protection, that welfare is threatened, the
community, represented by the Sovereign, is, on the broadest social and national
grounds, justified in displacing the parents and assuming their duties.335
The Court has also recognized in decisions like K.L.B. the multiplicity of factors
that parents may need to weigh in “attempting to decide which of an almost infinite
number of combinations of potential actions toward one’s child would best advance the
child’s interests.”336 It rejected the “proposition that everything that is not in a child’s best
interest”337 would constitute a breach of the parental fiduciary duty.
Ultimately, these matters engage an intricate balancing of interrelated interests—
of parents, children, and society, as represented by the state.338 Parental rights are
complex because of their very nature and the relationships they define. The Supreme
Court’s comments on parental authority reflect a multi-faceted conception, encompassing
334
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concerns relating to parental fiduciary duties, fundamental parental rights to autonomy
and freedom, the interests of the child, and the role and responsibilities of the state as
parens patriae. In the following section, I will explain in greater detail why this
complexity militates against insufficiently nuanced conceptions of parental rights.
3.4

Arguments for More Balanced Notions of Parental Autonomy
The constitutional rights at issue in cases such as B. (R.) and Hamilton are not

exclusive to parents. However, when those rights were examined in the context of
parental decision making, they were interpreted as granting parents the authority to make
certain decisions regarding not only themselves but also their children. The previous
section introduced various positions defending the allocation of some parental discretion
in child rearing, beyond what is required to meet minimum needs. Children’s
development, it is suggested, depends on more than the bare fulfillment of basic needs,
and this development and the richness of their childhood will be shaped in part by the
choices parents make. Moreover, some have argued, there is a special significance to
parenthood, the parent-child relationship, and the act of raising one’s children in one’s
own way—subject to limits such as the assurance of the child’s basic welfare. The
reasoning, then, is that certain fundamental rights, when exercised by parents, may be
construed as protecting parental decisions regarding important aspects of child rearing. In
making decisions on behalf of their children, parents will inevitably filter their judgment
through the lens of deeply felt and earnestly lived cultural beliefs. The profound
importance of those beliefs and their integrality to the parent’s identity (not to mention
their significance for the child and associated communities) may well justify their
protection. In this manner, parents may have limited other-determining rights, not
56

necessarily or solely for their own sake, but in part because of the unique nature of the
parent-child relationship. Assuming the validity of such rights, however, the courts’
treatment of parental rights in the cases above sometimes seemed to belie the context in
which they were exercised. These were parental rights that affected the intertwined lives
and interests of parent and child.
La Forest J.’s remarks are particularly startling in their attribution of acutely
personal and individualistic virtues to parental other-determining rights and decisions.
How can one justify parental rights over children on the basis of a parent’s freedom to
develop and realize her own potential, to plan her own life to suit her own character, to be
her own person?339 Stephen Toope sees this focus on individual autonomy as being
distinctly unhelpful in the context of family law, given that “[f]amilies are remarkably
complex constructions in which we express needs for independence, but also needs for
dependence and for support.”340 He suggests that “[i]f we adopt a contextual perspective
and ask ourselves how we experience the complexity of our own family life, . . . we will
not describe a bartering of autonomous interests.”341 For him, “a view of social relations
which sets up the individual as a self-contained entity struggling to protect herself from
any outside assaults upon her independence”342 is an inappropriate, “caricatured and
implausible description of the relationship between the individual and her several
communities.”343 Furthermore, when individual autonomy is contemplated in isolation,
“decisions are taken out of context and issues of responsibility and concern for others
339
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become lost.”344 Indeed, Jackson and Sclater add, it is “precisely commitments, duties and
relationships with others that give our lives meaning and character”.345
Fundamentally, “[t]he rights paradigm – based as it tends to be on a liberal vision
of ‘the citizen’ (liberalism’s unencumbered individual) – does not apply easily to the
family law field, where individual family members are encumbered with complex
interdependencies, needs, and relations of care.”346 Children may benefit when viable
familial bonds stay intact and parents are able to make decisions regarding their
upbringing, but children are not “mere extensions of their parents, or characters in the
story of their parents’ lives”.347 Despite their interdependence, parents and children do not
share identities, and their interests may not always be perfectly aligned. 348 The parent and
child should not be subsumed into one entity, such that parents can always be assumed to
speak decisively on behalf of an indivisible or amorphous family.349
In some cases, a particular child’s interests may best be served when the state
intervenes; where the parents’ interest to be free from state intervention clashes with a
child’s welfare, the latter must come first.350 And the state should not necessarily be
viewed as an adversary. In child protection cases, the parent is not asserting her rights as
against those of her child but rather invoking her constitutional rights as a shield against
state intervention. But although the state does not strictly speaking automatically
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“represent” the child, its actions are—at least in theory—grounded in a concern for the
child’s welfare and best interests. Wider communities are connected to the family and
have an interest in ensuring that children fare well and thrive. 351 As Boyd points out, “in
the

context

of

the

family, . . . the

interests

of

parents,

children,

and

government/community are often inter-related and/or all at stake in different ways.”352
It is interesting to note that certain commentators gravitate towards the opposite
extreme: the elimination of parental autonomy entirely. Godwin distinguishes parental
rights—defined as “the special legal powers of parents to control major aspects of their
children’s lives”353—from those constitutional rights granted to all.354 But her discussion
seems to hint at practical difficulties that arise when we attempt to isolate purely
“personal” decisions of parents from those that involve their children:
Parents in the real world are additionally not consistently or exclusively motivated
by their child’s perceived best interests. Parents have their own needs, interests,
and desires that are not identical to the best interests of their children.
Furthermore, parents often have to weigh the interests of one child against another
and may (intentionally or not) do so in an unequal fashion that does not serve the
best interests of at least one child. Some non-negligible minority of parents may
also simply not be especially driven to serve the best interests of their children,
and may be far more concerned with other aims, consciously or otherwise. There
is also a general tendency for people to interpret reality in ways biased towards
their own wishes. Given that parental interests are thoroughly implicated in
childcare decisions, parents are likely to interpret their children’s interests in a
manner consistent with their own wishes . . . . [However,] parental preferences . . .
may or may not have anything to do with a child’s best interests.”355
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Likewise, Dwyer’s position according to which “the other-determining rights parents
alone enjoy”356 are “distinct from the self-determining rights all competent adults
enjoy”357 assumes a deceptively clear line separating self- and other-determining
decisions where parents and their children are concerned.358
Parents are not subordinated to the lives of their children, transforming with the
advent of parenthood into mere conveyor belts producing future adults for the benefit of
society. Godwin points to Eamonn Callan’s view that, “while any moral theory that
interprets a child’s role as merely instruments of their parents would be objectionable, it
would also be objectionable to view a parent’s role in ways that reduce parents to mere
instruments of their children’s interests. Instead, parents should have discretion that does
justice to their hopes and aspirations.”359 William Galson adds that “[a]s parent, I am
more than the child’s caretaker or teacher, and I am not simply a representative of the
state delegated to prepare the child for citizenship. The hopes and sacrifices to which
Callan refers reflect the intimate particularity of the parent-child bond, the fact that the
child is in part (though only in part) an extension of ourselves.”360 If we assume that
individuals who become parents retain some measure of individuality and do not lose
their selfhood or distinctiveness,361 we should not be too quick to discard wholesale the
concept of parental autonomy.
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Beliefs and practices that are constitutionally protected are considered
fundamentally important, deeply held, and constitutive of identities. For individuals who
become parents, a commitment to such values will carry on colouring their decisions,
including those that concern their children. Dickson C.J., in Edwards Books,362
understood that the “profoundly personal beliefs [protected by s. 2(a)] govern one’s
perception of oneself, humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order
of being. These beliefs, in turn, govern one’s conduct and practices.”363 Recall also Orsi’s
observation about the impossibility of separating lived religion from all other aspects of
everyday life.364 Ultimately, Galston argues, “[w]e cannot detach our aspirations for our
children from our understanding of what is good and virtuous.”365
The struggle to capture the true complexity of parenthood also plays out in the
reasons of the Supreme Court. Lessard identifies Wilson J.’s decisions as embodying “the
greatest ambivalence”366 between the liberal emphasis on the individual and “[t]he
counter theme of community”.367 On the one hand, Lessard writes, “[i]t would be hard to
find a clearer statement of the classical liberal equation of freedom with exclusion,
boundaries, and individual sovereignty than her metaphorical description in Morgentaler
of rights as fences”.368 Wilson J. extended this vision to her portrait of parental liberty in
Jones, which takes as its “starting point . . . the aspirations of the restless and rebellious
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individual of classical liberalism”,369 who must be free “to plan his own life to suit his
own character, to make his own choices for good or ill, to be . . . ‘his own person’ and
accountable as such.”370
On the other hand, Wilson J. also saw the s. 7 liberty right as comprising parents’
rights to educate their children in accordance with their beliefs, which is for Lessard “a
notion of self-realization that is dependent on social relationship”.371 Wilson J. wrote that
“[t]he relations of affection between an individual and his family and his assumption of
duties and responsibilities toward them are central to the individual’s sense of self and of
his place in the world.”372 In other words, Lessard summarizes, parenting is “a social
activity which links the individual with community and through which both develop.”373
Ultimately, the challenge remains to find a balanced vision of parental autonomy
and rights that avoids two extremes: at the one extremity, a too-individualistic and
self-interested conception; and, at the other, an account that denies that parents, although
intimately connected to their children and their children’s interests, retain a measure of
individuality and autonomy. To this end, the second half of this thesis will explore a
different account of the rights at issue, as seen from the perspective of relational theory
and its “view of agency that is situated in the complex interconnectedness of human
life”.374
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Chapter 4: A Relational Perspective
4.1

General Introduction to Relational Theory
In this fourth chapter, I will survey some general principles of relational theory,

before examining their application to the current discussion. In exploring the contribution
of relational theory to the issues at hand, I come to the conclusion that, alone, the
relational or care perspective is insufficient, and that an approach integrating both care
and justice is the most promising path to take.
The previous chapter introduced liberalism’s core tenets and, in particular, the
value it places on autonomy. However, autonomy has been subject to a number of
different conceptualizations, occupying “a continuum that spans from the extreme
libertarian view of autonomy as atomistic, independent self-determination to the
communitarian extreme in which the importance of the individual is subjugated to the
needs and interests of the community.”375 Among detractors of the liberal individualistic
account are communitarians, whose view is held up as “the ideological counterpoise to
individualism”.376 Communitarians valorize the community, social obligations, and the
common good over individual concerns, rights, and autonomy;377 they adopt as their
ethical starting point the community, rather than the individual, and consider that
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community attachments determine individual identities and obligations.378 In short,
communitarianism stands for “the thesis that the community, rather than the individual,
. . . should be the focus – ontologically – of social analysis, and that community should be
the basis – normatively – for our values and principles.”379
Like communitarians, relational theorists express dissatisfaction at liberal
approaches to autonomy that, taken to their extreme, portray individuals as abstract,
insular, socially unencumbered, self-interested, and entirely self-sufficient.380 However,
relational theorists also reject the notion that people’s identities and obligations are
necessarily subsumed under or determined by any group or historical context in which
they find themselves.381 They see us as “defined by our connections with others at least as
much as by our individuality”,382 and therefore find worth in both distinct individuals and
relationships.383

Consequently,

relational

theorists

strive

to

balance

this

individual/collective duality and avoid the dichotomy384 set up by liberal and
communitarian perspectives that are insufficiently nuanced—that are, in Virginia Held’s
words, “for purposes of description, artificial abstractions from reality and, for purposes
of evaluation, implausible recommendations”.385
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Relational theory is predicated upon the inevitability of relational life386 and sees
the relational self as “socially connected, interdependent, socially encumbered, emotional,
relationally constructed, socially constructed, and embodied.”387 The relational individual
is “an entity that is produced through, and continually embedded in, relationships, but
experienced as a (largely self-directing) individual”.388 Interestingly, the notion of the
relational self quintessentially emerged from the parent-child relationship.389 Adapting the
concept of the relational self from its psychoanalytic origins, Carol Gilligan elaborated
the moral perspective now known as a care ethic, one of “several connected and
overlapping areas”390 comprising relational theory. Care ethicists consider that individuals
“are always selves-in-relationship”391 and point to the fact that each person inevitably
depends upon others for care and survival.392 They also stress “that a relationship requires
two selves, not one self in which the other is subsumed and consumed.”393
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It is in part because of this acknowledged potential for oppression, inequality, and
exploitation

in

relationships394

that

relational

theory

distances

itself

from

communitarianism and retains some of liberalism’s elemental components, notably the
primacy of individuals and their capacity for autonomy, for making choices and shaping
their lives and relationships.395 Nedelsky’s relational approach, for instance, overlaps with
liberalism396 and seeks more specifically “to challenge liberal individualism.”397
Although, like liberalism, Nedelsky’s position is equally committed to the equal worth
and distinctiveness of each individual,398 it is premised on the view that “liberalism is not
so much wrong as incomplete”399 in its failure to explicitly acknowledge relationships and
their indispensability in helping individuals to foster their capacities.400 Rather than
rejecting the concept of autonomy, relational theory seeks to reconceptualize it.401
Relational theorists renounce “the abstraction or character ideal of the ‘autonomous
man’”,402 an ideal that assumes that people could be—and therefore should also try to
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be—self-sufficient and independent.403 In their view, this ideal conflates autonomy with
individualism. By contrast, relational autonomy reflects the “shared conviction . . . that
persons are socially embedded and that agents’ identities are formed within the context of
social relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as
race, class, gender, and ethnicity.”404
Flowing from this reconceptualization of autonomy is the contention that even
though relationships may be constitutive, they are not necessarily determinative:405 for
relational theorists, “[t]he very concept of relational autonomy presupposes that
autonomy is possible for relational selves; and if that is so, then relationships cannot
determine who a person is or what she does or becomes.”406 Relational theory
acknowledges the influence of others on one’s autonomy, but relational autonomy means
being able “to choose which of the myriad of influences in one’s life to make ‘one’s
own’.”407 Because relational theorists recognize that not all relationships may be good
and that certain attachments may threaten one’s autonomy, dignity, or security,408 they
strive to “reconceptualize autonomy while retaining it for its emancipatory power”,409
vital in “[enabling] people to extricate themselves from bad relationships as well as to
transform the structures that shaped those relationships.”410
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Relational autonomy can be understood as comprising two dimensions: the
constitutive and the causal.411 The constitutive component focuses “on the social
constitution of the agent or the social nature of the capacity of autonomy itself”;412 in this
sense, individuals are relational in that they conceive of themselves and their world in
terms supplied by their various relationships.413 As Nedelsky puts it, “‘the content’ of
one’s own law is comprehensible only with reference to shared social norms, values, and
concepts.”414 The causal dimension focuses “on the ways in which socialization and
social relationships impede or enhance autonomy”415 and recognizes that the capacity for
autonomy develops, not in isolation, but through supportive relationships with intimate
others and within larger social structures.416 Interestingly, Nedelsky perceives child
rearing to be a striking metaphor for autonomy, so vividly does it illustrate how autonomy
can emerge through relationships.417
In their rejection of the atomistic model of the self, and in their attempt to
reconcile the individual with the collective, relational theorists also accord a greater role
to responsibilities. To value relationships and view life as more than just the pursuit of
personal goals is to understand “that meaningful lives can (and generally do) include
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forms of attachment that are authentic even though they cannot be easily be shed, such as
parents’ bonds to their children.”418 It is also to acknowledge the legitimacy of
responsibilities—even those not chosen as such, given that relationships generate, “over
time, obligations in excess of those devised by voluntary contractual undertakings”.419
The relational claim therefore is that “[r]ecognising moral duties to take account
of the interests of others is not antithetical to respect for autonomy.”420 In
reconceptualizing autonomy, relational theorists seek to ease the tension between duty
and autonomy. Instead of assuming that one’s autonomy requires freedom from others
and continual protection from the threat posed by “other (equally self-serving)
individuals”,421 the relational perspective equates autonomy with the individual capacity
for acting, “for defining, questioning, revising, pursuing one’s interests and goals”,422 a
capacity that exists through interaction with others.
Finally, their reconceptualization of the self also means that relational theorists
have reassessed other concepts “in terms of the relations they structure—and how those
relations can foster core values, such as autonomy.”423 In the following sections, I will
briefly explore relational approaches to the subjects of law, family, and parental
autonomy.
418
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4.1.1

Relational Theory and Law
Relational theorists distance themselves from the idea that autonomy is to be

“achieved by erecting a wall of rights around the individual”,424 to protect against
“intrusion by other individuals or by the state.”425 The concern, Elizabeth Kiss explains, is
that to reduce rights to mere markers of boundaries is to ignore their various other
functions:426
As Hohfield showed, rights can serve to separate and protect us from others; this
is, roughly, the function of liberty and immunity rights. But rights also confer
claims on others and powers to alter normative relationships. Rights as claims
entitle people to expect and demand the help of others in the form of goods and
services (such as a right to a fair trial or to free public education). Rights as
powers authorize people to alter legal and moral relationships – as in the right to
vote, to marry or divorce, to form associations, or to enter contracts.427
In fact, Kiss concludes, “ascribing rights to someone implies a moral connection to her or
him. Rights define a moral community; having rights means that my interests, aspirations,
and vulnerabilities matter enough to impose duties on others.”428
Relational theorists highlight this aspect of connection, viewing rights as less
about walls or fences, and more “about relationship”.429 As Nedelsky argues, “what rights
in fact do and have always done is construct relationships — of power, of responsibility,
of trust, of obligation.”430 To understand that rights structure relationships is also to
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recognize that they can delineate and protect ties between individuals and communities.
Some relational theorists therefore caution against dispensing altogether with “the
boundary-marking features of rights”,431 which remain important in particular for
vulnerable people.432 In Kiss’s words, “[t]he boundaries the law defines and enforces are
a means of wielding power, of shielding power and of shielding from power.”433 In
addition, “[v]ulnerable and stigmatized people often have the most to gain from the
protection that abstract and impersonal frameworks of rights can provide, and from the
strong images of integrity and self-assertion associated with rights.”434 Therefore the
relational approach attempts to simultaneously acknowledge the importance of rights
protections while rejecting the assumption that people always pose a threat to each other:
First, an emphasis on the threats posed by (some) others does not entail a belief
that all others are nothing more than threats to the self. . . . Second, the notion of
protecting individuals from the threats of others does not presuppose that
individuals are completely independent of all other individuals. Indeed, if
individuals were completely independent of each other, they would not need any
protections against each other. . . . Third, it is undeniable that people sometimes
harm each other and stopping these harms is a legitimate purpose of the state.435
In short, for relational theorists, it is simplistic, unrealistic, and undesirable to treat
autonomy simply as a shield against the threat of others,436 because it is through
interactions with others, rather than complete isolation, that autonomy develops.437 The
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individual/collective tension does not fully dissipate, because “[t]he collective . . . is a
source of . . . autonomy as well as a danger to it.’”438
When the role of the state is analyzed from this perspective, and when it is
accepted that “freedom” in the sense of complete independence is illusory, the emphasis
shifts. The objective, Nedelsky contends, is no longer about “protecting individual
autonomy by keeping the state at bay. The problem is how to protect and enhance the
autonomy of those who are within the (many) spheres of state power”.439 Given the
blurring of the line between the individual and the collective, between the private and the
public,440 Nedelsky reminds us that “in a democracy we cannot simply think of the
government in opposition to the people. . . . The boundary problems here are as complex
as in the personal and group relationships”.441 Fiona MacDonald argues in particular that
with regard to national groups like Canada’s Indigenous peoples, the state’s actions and
policies must structure relations between individuals, groups, and sources of power so as
to promote true group autonomy, understood in the relational sense as the capacity for
agency,442 and foster “relationships that are interdependent yet balanced in regard to
power and agency during interaction.”443 The recognition of the state’s role and continued
influence in these relations means that the definition of autonomy for such groups must
include their ability to hold others—including the state—to account.444
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Ultimately, Leckey considers that relational theorists can contribute generally to
legal analysis by calling attention to the need for greater contextualism, advocating for
relationships that promote autonomy, and revealing the normative assumptions that
determine what counts as context.445
The first of these potential contributions, Leckey explains, is supplied by
relational theory’s contextual methodology, which advances “[t]he idea that the meaning
of justice is to be worked out in a particular context”.446 Care ethicists insist on taking
into account concrete situations rather than cleaving to formality and abstraction, because
they see the danger in “applying general rules without regard for individuals and their
specific needs.”447 Arguing that such danger arises when “highly principled men . . .
sacrifice individuals for the sake of their principles”,448 they proffer as a paradigmatic
example the willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac for the sake of
principles.449
Secondly, among relational theory’s normative commitments is the promotion of
“a vision of mutually interdependent relationships as the norm around which legal and
ethical responses should be built.”450 The relational approach endorses attachment and
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connection, relationships that promote autonomy, and responsibility and responsiveness
to others, without requiring the sacrifice of one’s autonomy.451 Nedelsky asserts that of
greater normative importance than rights per se are “the core values such as equality and
autonomy that rights should promote in interpersonal relations.”452 In other words, “‘core
values are trumps.’ They form ‘foundational normative commitments’ . . . for assessing
rights practices and other relationships.”453
Lastly, relational theory brings to the fore the intersection between contextualism
and normativity: as Kim Lane Scheppele explains, “a story . . . only makes sense against a
background that limits the range of things that might be said. To describe the whole truth
is impossible; to describe a coherent partial truth means having some background
standards for deciding what is relevant and what is not.”454 Therefore, when the
contextual method is applied, “a key issue is often the boundary determining what does
and does not legitimately count. This boundary often depends on controversial normative
decisions.”455 Relational theory directs jurists to evaluate these decisions and make
normative assessments by asking “what kinds of laws and norms help structure
constructive relationships and which have helped generate the problems people are trying
to solve.”456 Nedelsky adds that they can also examine how a particular right shapes
relationships and, in turn, whether those relationships promote the specific values at
stake. In short, she writes, “[s]ometimes a relational analysis will cut through
451
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individualistic logic that denies the relevance of context. Sometimes a relational analysis
will reveal deep disagreements about underlying values.”457
4.1.2

Relational Theory, Family, and Care
Adopting a relational perspective of the family, Susan Boyd argues that “[t]he

rights paradigm – based as it tends to be on a liberal vision of ‘the citizen’ (liberalism’s
unencumbered individual) – does not apply easily to the family law field, where
individual family members are encumbered with complex interdependencies, needs, and
relations of care.”458 Similarly, Rollie Thompson asserts that “the use of ‘rights’ language
within the family setting [is] quite inapposite, given the complex interweaving of
dependency, altruism and autonomy in family relationships.”459 Relational theory and its
account of the unique nature of parenthood may go some way to meeting these concerns.
According to Bridgeman, legal principles that start from an assumption of
individualism “mean that parents are perceived as primarily self-interested.”460 In her
opinion, although this understanding of people “may be appropriate for some situations, it
fails to accord with the reality of the parent-child relationship, to support parents and
professionals as they seek to do their best for the child or to guide judges when asked to
adjudicate.”461 By contrast, the concept of individuals as being “primarily connected
rather than primarily separate”462 is more consistent with the nature of the parent-child
relationship. Indeed, for relational theorists, this relationship is paradigmatic and typifies
457
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the complex combination of both “connection and individuation”463 at the heart of the
theory. A parent or child “must be seen simultaneously as a distinct individual and as a
person

fundamentally

involved

in

relationships

of

dependence,

care,

and

responsibility.”464 Legal conceptions of rights, in particular parental rights, need to reflect
these two sides of human nature.465
Relational theory views parental rights as the means by which parents seek to
foster and protect their relationship with their children, as well as with larger
communities. For Lessard, where a parent holds religious beliefs and invokes a right to
rear his children according to those values, “his parental relationship becomes the basis of
his commitment to other members in his community. His children are not claimed as
property but are the link to others by which he defines himself and his contributions to the
community.”466
The emphasis on interdependence also refocuses the inquiry into the nature of the
parent-state relationship: the question is no longer whether parents have a right to be free
from state interference “but what power balance between state interference and parental
privacy rights best serves children”,467 parents, and the parent-child relationship. As
Laufer-Ukeles explains, “when it comes to caring for children, the state, parent, and child
have interests that are very much intertwined.”468 States theoretically have an interest in
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ensuring the protection and welfare of “their” children,469 and to invariably categorize
state action as violations “of individualistic liberty and privacy misses the ways that
children are partially and potentially fully dependent on the state and how parental rights,
state interest, and children’s rights are interrelated.”470
Correlatively, recognition of the state’s presence within this network of
intertwined responsibilities, dependencies, and influences also requires that the state be
held to account for its deeds and failings, a reckoning that is consistent with the relational
conceptualization of autonomy. In particular, the Canadian state has, in various ways and
at different times, seriously failed in its duties towards Indigenous parents and children
and, concomitantly, their families and communities. A relational approach to the
autonomy of those parents and communities demands a closer look at the role of the state
and its promotion or hindrance of those bonds and relationships.
4.1.3

Relational Theory and Parental Autonomy
In examining relational accounts of parental autonomy, I begin with the

observations of Jonathan Herring, who argues that parenthood cannot be “seen simply as
a project for self-realisation”471 and that the “intertwining of identities and interests”472
between parents and their children makes it impossible to separate their interests. Yet he
insists rather too emphatically, in my opinion, on the assimilation of the identities and
interests of people in relationships, through such statements as “[w]e do not break down
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into ‘me’ and ‘you’”;473 “[t]here should be no talk of balancing the interests of ‘the carer’
and the person ‘cared for’”;474 and “separating interests into individual rights is
impossible and undesirable.”475 Surely, an intermingling of interests is not the same as an
identity of interests. Although people in relationships should not conceive of themselves
and their actions in isolation, the relational approach, as I understand it, views them as
distinct, albeit interdependent, individuals. If there were no “you” and “me,” we would all
be one and the same, and there would be no issues to work through, no need to make
“sacrifices”,476 and no talk of the “give and take”477 that Herring refers to.
Perhaps this ambiguity proceeds from the tension inherent in the relational
account of autonomy, given that the collective represents both a source of and potential
threat to autonomy.478 Friedman describes this recurring issue as “the feminist
ambivalence . . . between thinking that autonomy should sometimes give way to relational
values and thinking that autonomy is relational in itself.”479 She explains it thus:
On the one hand, many feminists argue that interpersonal relationships contribute
to personal autonomy, and, indeed, are necessary for its realization. On the other
hand, many of these same feminists also suggest that the value of autonomy
473
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should not be emphasized at the expense of the values of interpersonal
relationships—as if the two were really mutually exclusive.480
Another way of characterizing the tension, as Herring does, is that “[t]he more our
relational nature is emphasised, the harder it is [to] define where the boundary [is]
between being oppressed within a relationship to such an extent that one loses autonomy
and where one is simply deeply embedded in relationship.”481
The degree of tension varies depending on the account of relational autonomy
being considered. Autonomy may be conceived of descriptively,482 such as when it is
seen as the capacity for agency, nurtured through and understood within social contexts.
On such an account, a person exercising her autonomy may choose to “sever some
particular relationships and thus no longer have as one of her ends a commitment to the
needs and interests of a particular other.”483 Such a procedural, content-neutral notion of
autonomy484 helps to dissipate some of the tension between individual autonomy and
attachments to others,485 notably because it offers no framework for critiquing
“substantively independent behavior, such as isolation, narcissistic self-absorption, and
indifference to the needs and desires of those to whom one is closely related. . . . It neither
condones nor condemns such behavior.”486
By contrast, other accounts of autonomy make both descriptive and normative
claims and question whether an isolationist self is actually “to be valued and
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promoted.”487 Proponents of such accounts reject the descriptive and normative claim that
human beings are presumably individualistic and contend “that the self is motivationally
social”,488 that the recognition that people do not live in isolation forces us to consider
how our decisions affect our intimates at the very least.489 In other words, Herring asserts,
“our decisions are not just ‘ours’”.490 Sevenhuijsen notes that from the point of view of a
care ethicist, “the moral subject in the discourse of care always already lives in a network
of relationships, in which s/he has to find balances between different forms of
responsibility (for the self, for others and for the relationships between them).” 491 This
approach, for Keller, “presupposes . . . the compatibility of one’s contrasting desires for
intimacy and for independence”.492
To incorporate normative principles into the conception of autonomy is to build
into the model “an internal system of morality”;493 but on what basis can such substantive
moral standards be elaborated and justified? After all, as Colin Gavaghan points out, the
relational theorists’ “recognition that emotions, relationships and perceived obligations
often play a part in decision-making is important. But such recognition that something
often happens is quite different from the insistence that it ought to happen. . . . It is
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possible to recognise, accept and make provision for a particular view or feeling, without
making it a universalisable moral imperative.”494
One such substantive account is Anne Donchin’s “relational approach to moral
responsibility”,495 whereby she reasons that “what we want for ourselves may not
enhance our autonomy if it can be attained only by dodging responsibilities toward others
who depend on us. Respect for their interests and their autonomy may require us to
relationalize our own autonomy in the course of advancing our plans and goals.”496
Drawing on the work of Donchin, among others, Michelle Taylor-Sands argues that
family members have obligations to one another because of the advantages they derive
from the relationship497 and that the value of intimacy “justifies compromising some
interests of individual members for the benefit of the family as a whole.”498
Also relying on Donchin’s and Nedelsky’s approaches, Herring contends that
there is value in relational obligations “because we continue to need each other and
494
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because we establish meaningful relationships through taking responsibility for each
other.”499 His proposed approach, called “relationship-based welfare”,500 assesses a
child’s best interests contextually. Like Taylor-Sands and Schoeman,501 he argues that
children may at times need to make compromises and sacrifices because “[a] relationship
based on unacceptable demands on a parent is not furthering a child’s welfare.”502 At the
same time, Blustein adds, parents “must adjust their individual needs and personal goals
to the needs and legitimate demands of their children.”503
In short, for these authors, relationships are valuable and require a certain give and
take, a “relationalizing” of one’s autonomy. One actual instance of such
“relationalization” can be found in the following discussion among parents participating
in a study:
Our participants were saying that good parents must give up some ways of
exerting control over their children, even when such control is in principle
possible. A conventional evaluation would see this as a loss of the ability to make
choices that are self-determining (such as, “I choose to be the parent of a girl, not
of a boy”), and hence a loss of autonomy. But we think the participants were
claiming something more than that having children places constraints on a
person’s freedom, or even that cultural expectations of how parents should behave
places constraints on their choices. They were saying that certain kinds of choice
that would be legitimate in another context are not merely inappropriate if
exercised by a parent: they are incompatible with the nature of the good
parent-child relationship, as they understood it. The identity of the good parent is
constituted by this voluntary self-limitation. Parental autonomy can only operate
within the limits set by this framework. Otherwise the choices, however freely
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made or in line with the individual’s life goals, do not foster the autonomy of a
good parent, but of an individual failing to be an adequate one.504
The question now is whether relational theory provides parents with guidelines on
how to “relationalize” their autonomy and assess their child’s interests. As Gavaghan puts
it, if a child’s obligations must “be carefully balanced against the child’s individual
interests, . . . that brings us back to the undeniably speculative and uncertain business of
identifying and quantifying those interests.”505
Eva Kittay proposes her “idea of a transparent self—a self through whom the
needs of another are discerned, a self that, when it looks to gauge its own needs, sees first
the needs of another.”506 This transparent self “does not allow its own needs to obscure its
perception of another’s needs nor to have its own needs offer a resistance to its response
to another.”507 It is a standard—particularly crucial where young children are
concerned—whereby “[t]he perception of and response to another’s needs are neither
blocked out nor refracted through our own needs.”508 However, Kittay’s “transparent
self” is objectionable to those for whom “mothering does not ‘require self erasure’”.509
Sara Goering, for example, argues that an individual who becomes a parent “doesn’t so

504

Jackie Leach Scully, Sarah Banks & Tom W Shakespeare, “Chance, choice and control: Lay debate on
prenatal social sex selection” (2006) 63 Social Science & Medicine 21 at 29–30 [italics in original;
underlining added].
505
Gavaghan, supra note 494 at 931 [emphasis in original]. Gavaghan adds: “But the notion that this gives
rise to a universal duty to prioritise family members seems to require some additional steps, which are not
spelt out” (ibid at 931).
506
Eva Feder Kittay, Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency (Routledge: New York,
1999) at 51 [emphasis in original; Kittay, Love’s Labor].
507
Ibid.
508
Ibid.
509
Amber E Kinser, “Mothering as Relational Consciousness” in Andrea O’Reilly, Feminist Mothering
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008) 123 at 125. See also Kittay’s subsequent
clarification: Kittay, “Overlapping Consensus”, supra note 389.

83

much fade to transparency; rather, herself is expanded to include the child.”510 In this
transformation “from ‘I’ to ‘we’”,511 Goering envisions a “plural subject . . . [that]
“intentionally [chooses] together on the basis of shared interests, aims, or values.”512
Accordingly, “[i]n managing the expanded self, mothers have to negotiate competing
demands and interests in the service of achieving what is good for the ‘we’ that includes
child and mother.”513
Interestingly, a common thread that appears to traverse much of the guidance
provided is the theme of perceptual clarity. To become the transparent self, one must
ensure that one’s “perception of and response to another’s needs are neither blocked out
nor refracted through [one’s] own needs.”514 Sara Ruddick suggests that one must “see
the child’s reality with the patient, loving eye of attention”.515 Held advises that
“[m]othering persons cannot lose sight of the particularity of the child being mothered nor
of the actuality of the circumstances in which the activity is taking place.”516 Michael
Slote’s notion of empathy “involves seeing or feeling things from the standpoint of
others”;517 Slote, like others, nevertheless cautions that empathy does not involve the
merging of identities and interests.518
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In the context of medical decision making, Bridgeman argues that parents should
not allow their religious convictions to prevent them from considering all factors pertinent
to the determination of the best interests of their child; for their part, courts must also
avoid “relying exclusively upon medical evidence.”519 Courts must address, if relevant,
considerations such as “the fact that the child has been born to parents (who as far as we
know are loving, caring parents) adhering to the tenets of their chosen religion”,520 as well
as “the infringement of their genuinely held beliefs about the wider best interests of their
child”.521 For Bridgeman, “those responsible for the future medical treatment of the child
[must] consider the child as an individual and not an extension of his or her parents or a
medical object. For the parents this entails appreciating that their child, whilst being
dependent upon their care, is an individual – both connected to them but separate from
them.”522 For others involved, this means considering factors such as the parents’
arguments, the history of care, the context of the parents’ decision, any circumstances in
which the parents might deem the treatment acceptable, and what support or pressure may
be coming from the parents’ community.523
Bridgeman puts forward the U.K. case Poynter v. Hillingdon Health Authority524
as an instance in which the parents’ ardent spiritual beliefs influenced their decision
without blinding them to other factors to be considered: “His mother explained that her
spiritual beliefs would have been sufficient for her to refuse consent for herself but that
Lorraine Code, eds, Feminist Perspectives: Philosophical Essays on Method and Morals (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1988) 109 at 122.
519
Bridgeman, Parental Responsibility, supra note 66 at 146.
520
Ibid.
521
Ibid.
522
Ibid at 147.
523
Ibid.
524
37 BMLR 192 (QBD).

85

the decision was for her son, not for her. As his father said: ‘We agreed to the transplant
because we thought it wrong to impose our views on Matthew.’”525 In another case,526
one in which the parents rejected the medical treatment proposed, Bridgeman describes
how the parents’ “religious beliefs were one of the factors leading to their decision to
refuse the separation surgery”527 recommended for their conjoined twins.
Finally, Bridgeman observes that “[r]esponsibilities arise out of relationships and
are determined by need and individual interpretation”.528 However, she notes,
“interpretation of needs occurs within a social context which has to be examined.”529
Indeed, it is precisely because parental decision making happens not in isolation but
rather in various social contexts that different tensions arise, including within the parents
themselves. As Amber Kinser remarks, “[m]othering practices intersect the multiple
relationships of which I am part, the multiple selves I embody at home, at work, and in
my community, the multiple family subsystems and suprasystems that overlap in my
life.”530 For Kinser “all of these selves overlap with, crash into, inform, undermine,
strengthen, and create friction for each other.”531
Conflict and social context are part of Sara Ruddick’s reflections on maternal
thinking, and she theorizes that “[i]n their practices, people respond to a reality that
appears to them as given, as presenting certain demands. The response to demands is
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shaped by interests”,532 which are “always and only expressed as interests of people in
particular cultures and classes of their cultures, living in specific geographical,
technological, and historical settings.”533 Using the example of childcare, Ruddick
reasons that “agents of maternal practice”534 act in response to their children’s demands
“that their lives be preserved and their growth be fostered”, 535 in addition to their social
group’s “‘demands’ that their growth be shaped in a way acceptable to the next
generation.”536 The satisfaction of these demands will be governed by certain interests,537
including that of acceptability—that is, the requirement that the parent raise her child to
become “a sort of adult that she can appreciate and others can accept.”538
But tensions inevitably arise, Ruddick predicts, because these various interests
“are frequently and unavoidably in conflict.”

539

Moreover, “[t]he interest acceptability

will always . . . provoke mothers to affirm and announce some values, their own or
others.”540 In the end, Ruddick does not provide a solution to these tensions, concluding
only that “[a]lthough some mothers will deny or be insensitive to the conflict and others
will be clear about which interest should take precedence, mothers typically will know
that they cannot secure each interest, will know that goods conflict, will know that
unqualified success in realizing interests is an illusion.”541
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4.1.4

Relational Theory: Not Enough?—an Integration of Care and Justice
This brief exploration of the relational account of parental autonomy has left a

number of issues unresolved. We have seen the position that parents, in making decisions,
should “relationalize” their autonomy in some manner. On becoming parents, they might
see themselves as a “plural subject” or an “expanded self,” negotiating different and
sometimes conflicting demands and interests. They might be empathetic, attempting to
see things from their children’s perspective. They might become a “transparent self” and
avoid being blinded to all relevant factors when assessing their child’s best interests.
Yet none of these suggestions seems to go much further in helping parents to
evaluate those interests and work out potential conflicts. As Leckey puts it, the problem is
that adopting a contextual approach “may reframe conflicts, but . . . it does not indicate
how to resolve them.”542 The evaluation of interests remains subjective, and different
values and interests may collide. Although relational theorists acknowledge that
“intimacy impedes choice”,543 the relational model seems to have few internal parameters
for defining those limits. How would theorists approach a scenario, for instance, in which
caring parents make a decision within a certain social context, a decision that conforms to
the dictates of their conscience and values, and guarantees some of their child’s interests
but at the expense of other critical ones? An emphasis on the interconnected nature of
parents and children may make it harder to “define where the boundary [is] between
being oppressed within a relationship . . . and where one is simply deeply embedded in
the Social Character of Free Will” (2007) 15:1 J Political Philosophy 1 (on “mestiza autonomy,”
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relationship”,544 but surely there must be limits—if not internal, then at least external—to
the sacrifices demanded, particularly of children.
Care ethicists do acknowledge that “care of (the unique) ‘self’ is also
important.”545 Herring specifies that a child is expected to be altruistic only “to a limited
extent”.546 Similarly, Schoeman states that parents may “compromise the child’s interests
for ends related to family welfare”,547 but without sacrificing “their children’s lives or
welfare”.548 He recognizes that even though “[i]t is difficult to set explicit limits on what
parents may decide for their children when such a decision does not accord well with
accepted public standards”,549 limits must nevertheless be set. However, he adds an
important caveat: “an effort must be [made] to appreciate the meaning of such practices
for those involved.”550
For Taylor-Sands, “[t]he nature and extent of compromise required within a
particular family will vary according to the individual circumstances of that family”.551
Although she considers it “particularly difficult to draw the line on the types of risks to
which parents should be allowed to expose their children in the context of religious or
cultural identification, when the decision conflicts with accepted public standards relating
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to education or bodily integrity”,552 she does accept “that parents should not be able to
sacrifice the basic interests of the child . . . for the sake of the family as this would
amount to exploitation, abuse and/or neglect.”553 Relationships may require a certain give
and take, but there are “limits to what parents can require of their children in order to
promote collective family interests.”554
These comments suggest that external limitations on relational autonomy may be
warranted. Perhaps the takeaway, then, is that relational theory may not always be
enough. After all, as Kaylee McNeil pithily remarks, while parents may be caring, “caring
alone is important but not entirely sufficient.”555 Ultimately, Kiss concludes, care ethics
cannot constitute “a comprehensive moral alternative”:556 it requires principles that can
identify when care becomes detrimental.557 People must, Kiss explains, be “protected
from harm and guaranteed the capacity to exercise some control over their lives and to
make certain claims on one another – precisely the kind of moral work which rights
do.”558 In other words, it is the work of the ethics of justice.
Commentators who agree on the need for justice alongside care include McNeil,
who states that “family relationships require respect for the autonomy and bodily integrity
of others in order to be just, meaning that there must be a limit on the intrusion that one
makes into the decision-making of others such that one does not dominate other members
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of their family.”559 Kira Tomsons and Susan Sherwin argue that we can acknowledge that
a parent’s “decision was apparently motivated by beneficence and love, yet we
understand that the caring relationships in which we are embedded are subject to
questions of justice and morality.”560 From this perspective, we might judge for instance
that parents who refuse life-saving care for their children “may be acting in the interests
of care in their role as parents, but may fail to be just in familial relationships in that they
may arguably misuse their asymmetrical positioning to their children in order to make
decisions that are ultimately not beneficial to their children from a medical
perspective.”561
Held further observes that because care usually involves power imbalances and
vulnerability, “the person cared for may find the relation more satisfactory in various
respects if both persons, but especially the person caring, are guided to some extent by
principles concerning obligations and rights.”562 Likewise, for Taylor-Sands, “[a]dopting
a relational model does not necessarily entail abandoning all of the protections offered by
liberal or rights-based theories”.563 In the family context, such “generalised accounts of
morality can be helpful for . . . drawing limits on what an intimate family can require of
individual members.”564 As Herring summarizes it, “[w]ithout justice care can become
abuse and without care justice loses its heart.”565
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Some fusion of care and justice therefore seems necessary. But how would such
an amalgamation play out? Clement argues that reconciling the two and achieving a fuller
account of moral reasoning and autonomy566 “requires moving beyond these ideal types
and finding the right balance between the connections and separations between
individuals.”567 This balance is found somewhere within the notion of the relational self
and an understanding of care and justice that does not view the two ethics as being
mutually exclusive.568 More specifically, Clement writes, the two should be relied on
simultaneously in any given situation and must function interdependently in the sense
“that each of the ethics provides conditions necessary to a morally adequate version of the
other ethic.”569
In essence, both ethics share similar elements, namely, their “relative abstractness
or concreteness, their priorities, and their conceptions of the self.”570 The ethic of care
prioritizes contextual decision making, the maintenance of relationships, and the social
nature of the self.571 The ethic of justice emphasizes abstract decision making, equality,
and individualism.572 But really, Clement argues, the difference between the two “is a
difference in emphasis, not in kind.”573
Each ethic acts as a necessary check upon the other and helps to identify better or
worse versions of the other;574 in the absence of one, the other “tends to take on
566
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exaggerated, distorted forms by focusing on only one of two interrelated sets of
features.”575 On the one hand, an individualistic approach may fail to capture the ways “in
which care requires connection between individuals.”576 On the other hand, the care
orientation risks fusing identities and interests, treating two people as being “so connected
that their well-beings are inseparable, when in fact they are to some degree distinct.”577 In
other words, whereas we must not assume an “individualism of interests,” we may
presuppose “the non-identity of interests”.578 The emphasis on the individual in the ethic
of justice is useful in that it “demonstrates the ways in which genuine care requires
separation between individuals.”579 Otherwise, care can become distorted if “the carer
identifies so completely with the recipient that she loses her critical perspective”,580 if the
carer “denies the recipient’s individual identity”,581 or if the carer sees only her own
perspective and consequently “stifle[s] diversity and otherness”.582
In sum, we should understand that “the ethic of justice requires not just abstract
principles but contextual details as well. Likewise, the ethic of care requires not only
contextual details but general principles as well.”583 Each one is dependent on the other,
Clement explains, because “[a]ttention to detail helps us formulate, select, and apply
general principles, which in turn put the details in moral perspective and thus help us
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select which details are relevant for our consideration.”584 Neither ethic is adequate
alone.585
Two final observations are in order. Held points out that the exact manner in
which “care and justice are to be meshed without losing sight of their differing priorities
is a task still being worked on.”586 Clement also cautions that the conclusions yielded by
each of the two ethics may sometimes clash and lead to unresolvable tensions.587 In fact,
she notes, “justice considerations alone often conflict, such as in rights conflicts, and
there is often no metaprinciple that allows us to reconcile these conflicts. Attention to the
ethic of care adds to our considerations, and thus to the potential conflicts we face.”588 In
the end, she concludes, “[a]dequate moral reasoning will not necessarily yield simple
answers, but it will consider all relevant considerations, and both the ethic of justice and
the ethic of care direct us to relevant considerations.”589
We are therefore still left wondering how these principles may be translated into
practice. In the following and final section of this chapter, I will re-examine the matters at
hand from a more relationally inclined perspective and propose an approach that
integrates care and justice considerations with the help of Berger’s reflections on the
adjudicative virtues of fidelity and humility.
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4.2

From Theory to Case Law

4.2.1

A More Relational Perspective of Religious Freedom
Lessard detects some ambivalence within the reasons in B. (R.), just as with

Wilson J.’s dissent in Jones. Although she praises Wilson J.’s approach for its inclusion
of a more relational perspective, Lessard cautions that it may nevertheless perpetuate
individualism, insofar as it also “permits a portrayal of familial attachments and
responsibilities as merely instrumental in the self-fulfilment of the choosing, planning
individual”.590 In Lessard’s opinion, both Jones and B. (R.) show deep divisions within
the Court in its vision of the dynamics between individual rights protections and family
relationships and, more specifically, in its attempt to reconcile, with difficulty, the
Charter’s liberal, individual rights framework with conservative family values.591 In
B. (R.), the plurality resolved this predicament through what she calls “a neoconservative
synthesis”,592 by “somewhat awkwardly [fusing] conservative conceptions of the family
onto the fundamentally liberal design of the liberty rights protection.”593
Lessard explains that, in marked contrast to Wilson J.’s “indirect sanctioning of
the traditional family”594 in Jones, the B. (R.) plurality showed a “willingness to more
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clearly and explicitly entrench conservative values as constitutional values.”595 In her
view, the plurality “endorsed a specific notion of parent-child relations in accordance
with which children are only notionally present as legal persons and rightsholders”596 and
wherein “an individual parent’s rights include the right to ‘choose’ to have a family and
maintain (naturally) authoritative parental relationships.”597 This vision of the family is,
for Lessard, “deeply and explicitly conservative”.598 She concludes that La Forest J.
essentially “[constitutionalized] the traditional structure of the family by stating that the
individual right to liberty directly translates into society’s customary privileging of
parental authority to bring up and make choices for children.”599
Lessard’s observations afford us new angles from which to view B. (R.), notably
in light of Leckey’s assertion that relational theorists can contribute to legal analysis by
advocating for contextualism and calling attention to the oftentimes controversial norms
that determine the boundaries of the context.600 Diana Majury and Anne Quéma add that
advocacy for contextualism “is not so much about introducing contextualizing methods as
about exposing the normative nature of what has always been done.”601 By unearthing
those norms, we can go “beyond the cleavage between an acontextual and a contextual
method.”602 In this sense, we need not assume that the apparently individualistic portrait
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of parents in B. (R.) resulted from a lack of contextualization.603 As Lessard explains,
“[t]he currency of discourse is still abstract individualism”,604 but “the purportedly
universal parent who stands at the centre of the first part of the liberty analysis is, in
effect, a person whose understanding and practice of parenting conforms to dominant
cultural norms.”605 From this perspective, we might see that this conceptualization of
individuals, parents, and relationships “masked the contextualizing method at work in the
courts’ assessments: these [universalized] figures legitimized cultural, gender, and
economic norms that constituted the normative context of the historical period.”606 The
plurality’s reasons were not a-contextual, to the extent that the chosen context was that of
“well-established and customary social hierarchies.”607
Alongside Lessard’s argument that B. (R.) blends individualistic and conservative
values, we can add the following observation by Macleod: the notion that “[t]he parental
right of self-determination . . . [implies] a right of child-determination”608 is a
“conservative conception [that] rests partly on collapsing the distinction between parent
and child. The child is viewed as ‘an extension of the self,’ and there is consequently an
‘identity between chooser and chosen for’”,609 as well as between their interests.610
Echoing Lessard, Macleod notes that the conservative view of children “as mere
ingredients in their parents’ life plans”611 fails to properly recognize the children’s distinct
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moral status. Macklin adds that if the identity-of-interests assumption is taken to its
logical extreme, “it would be hard to rebut the contention that the interest of children of
Jehovah’s Witnesses is precisely what their parents deem it to be.”612 This fusion of
identities and interests is one of the risks inherent in the ethic of care, and one that may be
counterbalanced by the integration of the justice perspective.
Also noteworthy in La Forest J.’s delineation of religious freedom and parental
autonomy was the exclusion of internal constraints. As Beaman explains, the Court was
essentially asking itself “[W]hat is freedom? Does it have ‘internal limits’ that comprise
part of our understanding of what it means to talk about being free?”613 Beaman argues
that the freedom of a citizen in a democracy “is bounded by the citizen herself, who
makes . . . ‘responsibilized choices’ within the context of that freedom.”614 If we accept
the necessity of “responsibilized” or “relationalized” choices in the exercise of parental
autonomy, this would suggest the imposition of certain internal constraints upon
autonomy—a path La Forest J. apparently did not take.
To be sure, the Court has never conceived of religious freedom as being limitless.
In Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15,615 for instance, La Forest J. recalled
that freedom of religion is not unlimited “and is restricted by the right of others to hold
and to manifest beliefs and opinions of their own, and to be free from injury from the
exercise of the freedom of religion of others. Freedom of religion is subject to such
limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals and the
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fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”616 La Forest J. was moreover acutely aware
of the importance of context and its place in the analysis. He cited Wilson J.’s approach in
Edmonton Journal, “where she speaks of the danger of balancing competing values
without the benefit of a context.”617 Such balancing, he acknowledged, could occur within
the delineation of the right, and “one could avoid the dangers of an overly abstract
analysis simply by making sure that the circumstances surrounding both the use of the
freedom and the legislative limit were carefully considered.”618 However, he preferred
reconciling rights conflicts and justifying limits under s. 1, as it “places the burden of
justifying limits on the state and preserves religious freedom more effectively than would
trying to define religion”.619
Be that as it may, one of the consequences of this approach is the now-familiar
criticism that “Justice La Forest’s ‘isolated’ view portrays the individual in a fashion
associated with classical liberalism, namely, as an abstract agent whose happiness
consists of the unimpeded pursuit of subjectively defined preferences.”620 According to
Lessard, this view gives the impression that religious freedom “must be at least
presumptively unqualified by any consideration for the relational dimension of individual
selfhood, even when the text of the Constitution itself would seem to demand
acknowledgement of a more complex and interconnected social landscape.”621
By contrast, the minority’s reasons appear to some commentators to be more
contextualized, given their reference to other rights holders and the social nature of
616
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peoples’ lives.622 Lessard lauds Iacobucci and Major JJ. for their ostensibly relational
approach, according to which “parental liberty can be given a meaning that incorporates
the obviously relational nature of parenting rather than casting children as potentially
hostile interests which might provide, either reasonably or unreasonably, a basis for the
state to constrain parenting choices.”623 Yet this approach is not without its own
problems, including a paradoxically individualistic interpretation of parents, children,
communities, and religion. Iacobucci and Major JJ. declined to rely on s. 1 and stated that
religious freedom must be limited internally such that its definition excludes harm to
others. The problem, in Von Heyking’s opinion, is that “they leaned toward an extreme
individualistic definition when they treated the freedom of religion of the infant,
Sheena”.624 In particular, their response to the parents’ assumption that Sheena shared
their religion “asserts a peculiar individualistic vision”625 of religious freedom:
Sheena has never expressed any agreement with the Jehovah’s Witness faith, nor,
for the matter, with any religion, assuming any such agreement would be
effective. There is thus an impingement upon Sheena’s freedom of conscience
which arguably includes the right to live long enough to make one’s own reasoned
choice about the religion one wishes to follow as well as the right not to hold a
religious belief.626
In answer to La Forest J.’s preference for examining limits under s. 1, Iacobucci
and Major JJ. countered that “[s]uch an approach elevates choosing to refuse one’s child
necessary medical care on account of one’s personal convictions to the level of
constitutionally protected activity.”627 But in taking this position, they largely bypassed
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any discussion into the nature of the harm and the reasonableness of the state’s
intervention. As Van Praagh argues, “[i]n making the assertion that the Bs must not act
contrary to their child’s rights to life, security, and safety, . . . they appeared to link those
rights to Sheena B.’s needs as defined by doctors and child protection officials.”628 Van
Praagh states that by automatically deferring to those officials, the minority judgment
“failed to recognize the value and importance of Sheena’s family to her.”629
Not only was Sheena B. not understood as a member of her family in the picture
of children’s rights offered by Iacobucci and Major JJ., but her community
affiliations played absolutely no role. . . . As we have seen, children may be
nurtured and may flourish within their religious communities; they can also be
seriously hurt in a way connected to religious principles or practices. Without any
acknowledgement of the complex matrix of relationships and influences within
which children exist and develop their autonomy, a picture of children’s rights
seems somewhat empty.630
Furthermore, in their application of the best interests test, Iacobucci and Major JJ.
held that “[t]he nature of the parent-child relationship is . . . not to be determined by the
personal desires of the parent, yet rather by the ‘best interests’ of the child”631—as if one
necessarily precluded the other. Any concept of children’s rights, Van Praagh observes,
must factor in children’s reliance on others—adults, communities, and states—for their
care and development.632 This dependence is difficult to square with an account of
individual rights and autonomy as freedom from others, including from the state.633 The
contemporary state does concern itself with children’s well-being, Van Praagh adds, and
“‘[i]ntervention’ in families and the lives of children is implied in many aspects of the
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relationship between a state and its citizens.”634 She therefore finds it ironic that the
minority’s focus on children actually “makes less room for considering the implications
of child welfare decisions for diverse communities and their young members.”635
Horwitz likewise takes the minority to task for its treatment of the child’s
interests, just as he criticizes La Forest J. for his comment that “[w]hile it may be
conceivable to ground a claim on a child’s own freedom of religion, the child must be old
enough to entertain some religious beliefs in order to do so.”636 He sees such opinions as
indicative of “the Court’s continuing inclination to view religion not as a cultural
phenomenon or (at least for some adherents) communitarian activity, but as a matter of
individual choice.”637
Therefore, whereas La Forest J. focused on parental rights and downplayed the
role of children and communities, Iacobucci and Major JJ. preferred a child-centric
analysis that equally obscured parental and communal ties. Whereas La Forest J. took an
identity of interests for granted, Iacobucci and Major JJ. assumed a clash. And in wishing
to distance themselves from La Forest J.’s purportedly “isolated” view of parental rights,
Iacobucci and Major JJ. ultimately adopted a strangely individualistic portrait of
childhood, one that includes parents but seems to presume conflict. As Leckey notes, “[i]t
is striking how rapidly an ostensibly contextual approach manifests the imprint of
presumptions and prior models.”638
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Such presumptions are also evident in the framing of the constitutional question.
Iacobucci and Major JJ. were “of the view that the constitutional question should be: to
what extent can an infant’s right to life and health be subordinated to conduct emanating
from a parent’s religious convictions?”639 This question has the benefit of highlighting the
dynamics between the exercise of parental autonomy and its consequences for children,
but it also leads with a presumption of harm or excess, and denormalizes the parents’
religion. And “[f]ramed as such, the answer followed that s. 2(a) of the Charter does not
include the imposition on children of religious practices which threatened their safety,
health or life.”640
By comparison, the constitutional question with regard to freedom of religion as
addressed by La Forest J. was whether the statutory provision depriving the parents “of
the right to refuse medical treatment for their infant on religious grounds, violates their
freedom of religion guaranteed by s. 2(a) of the Charter.”641 When the issue is framed in
this manner, Van Praagh explains, “state intervention in response to danger or harm to
children appears to have serious implications only for the parents involved.”642 In fact,
La Forest J. specifically adds that “[w]hile it may be conceivable to ground a claim on a
child’s own freedom of religion, the child must be old enough to entertain some religious
beliefs in order to do so.”643 This comment, together with Iacobucci and Major JJ.’s
position that Sheena’s religious identity was not at issue because “Sheena has never
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expressed any agreement with the Jehovah’s Witness faith,”644 tends to illustrate Moon’s
theory about the dual nature of religion—as both personal commitment and cultural
identity—and how this duality is particularly evident in the hard cases presented by
parental rights and medical decision making for children.645
Speaking to the Supreme Court’s “roundly criticized”646 emphasis on
individualism in B. (R.), Van Praagh suggests that a shift in “focus from individual rights
to the relationship among children, families, communities and the state”647 would tell a
more complete story. The parents’ values and actions might then be understood to “stem
from their membership in a community of persons who share the same beliefs, and from a
community-shared sense of obligation or accountability to their God”,648 rather than be
seen as a choice made in isolation or under the threat of others. Moreover, religious faith
and cultural membership can both be construed as articulations of autonomy.649 Emily
Gill posits that “belief and conscience may both be viewed as aspects of identity that are
constitutive, yet also operate as expressions of autonomy.”650 This is what she terms
“constitutive choice”: “because meaning is not self-defining or self-interpreting”,651
people may still need to “decide for themselves the claims of their particularistic
identities or faiths, working out their meanings over time”.652
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A more relational account might also recognize that, for “children of faith,”
religion and religious communities play a large role in their personal development653 and
are “firmly integrated into their sense of self, agency and responsibility.”654
Concomitantly, the children’s membership is crucial for the vitality and survival of those
communities.655 In this regard, religious communities are always implicitly implicated in
the scope of parental rights and affected by limitations thereto.656
But an added emphasis on relationship, responsibility, and context cannot by itself
resolve all difficulties. As Van Praagh observes, religious communities can be a source of
both good and harm in children’s lives.657 Parents themselves may belong to many
relationships and communities, and may embody multiple and conflicting selves.658 They
may be unable to work out these tensions. Faced with a situation in which their child’s
interests collide, they may make a decision that satisfies their conscience and their values
but that also jeopardizes certain of the child’s interests while fulfilling others. Even the
ostensibly individualistic approach in B. (R.), upon further analysis, reveals an arguably
relational perspective, but one that privileges a certain kind of parent-child relationship
resting on a particular view of parental authority and fused parent-child identities. This is
a conception that reflects one of the risks of care ethics, namely, the identity of interests
between carer and cared-for. Just as relational theorists recognize that a child may be a
cared-for “child of faith,” so too do they acknowledge that caring relationships “can be
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sites of inequality”659 and that justice must set some limits to protect children from
serious harm.660 So how might the principles of care and justice interact and be applied in
these circumstances? At this point, I turn to Berger, in whose work I see a deft illustration
of how the theory might function in practice.
Berger views s. 2(a) as the site where law formally encounters religion and
demonstrates its attitude of “liberal modus vivendi tolerance.”661 In actuality, he explains,
law simply “tolerates that which is different only so long as it is not so different that it
challenges the organizing norms, commitments, practices, and symbols of the Canadian
constitutional rule of law.”662 If a particular conduct or belief is deemed “intolerable,” the
analysis moves to s. 1 to assess “whether the limit on legal tolerance is justified”663 in
light of “the values, assumptions, and symbolic commitments of the culture of Canadian
constitutionalism itself.”664 In the end, Berger concludes, “the courts will either deem the
conduct intolerable and require the religious group or individual to conform to the norms
and commitments of Canadian constitutionalism, or the courts will conclude that the state
was wrong in limiting this instance of religious diversity because this expression of
cultural pluralism is itself consistent with those values and commitments.”665
Berger takes pains to specify that he is claiming “neither that law merely ‘has it
wrong,’ nor that its conception of religion must change.”666 In his view, “[t]he framing
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intuitions, symbolic commitments, and interpretive practices that inform Canadian
constitutional law’s understanding of religion are no more or less mutable than those that
comprise a religious culture.”667 Consequently, he argues, it is not “that law has
misunderstood religion. Law has understood religion; it has simply done so in keeping
with the culture of Canadian constitutionalism.”668 Once an issue appears before the
courts, he explains, the debate necessarily takes place in the discourse of liberal legal
culture, using “the language of rights constitutionalism, privileging the terms autonomy,
equality, and choice. The salient concepts are those of the public and the private,
jurisdiction, and standing. The ways become the way of legal process, and the matter is
firmly set within the institutions and traditions of interpretation of the culture of law’s
rule.”669 Therefore, when law encounters religion, the result is a “complicated
intercultural encounter”,670 with law retaining its own symbolic commitments rather than
acting as a neutral referee above the cultural fray.671
But Berger reassures us that judges need not become indifferent relativists upon
acknowledging law’s lack of neutrality.672 To the contrary, “[e]very cultural form has its
peculiar gifts, and the judge has a special role in cultivating and caring for the public gifts
of a liberal constitutional culture, of which there are many.”673 So what are judges to do?
Berger suggests that they adopt a particular “adjudicative sentiment”674 or “ethos”,675 one
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that combines “a kind of fidelity to the culture of the constitutional rule of law”676—in
other words, justice—together with “a kind of humility”677—in other words, care.
Firstly, Berger explains, fidelity stands for the way in which it is both necessary
and proper for a judge in a liberal constitutional order “to manifest fidelity to the terms,
projects, and goods of Canadian constitutionalism”,678 to respect its values of “liberty,
human dignity, equality, autonomy, and the enhancement of democracy.”679 The judge
“appreciates . . . that each act of judgment necessarily participates in and draws integrity
from a unique and rich web of meanings and ways of framing experience.”680 This virtue,
in my view, represents the practical application of the ethic of justice.
Secondly, humility emerges from the recognition that Canadian constitutionalism
is “a cultural form”,681 one that “is always in competition with other cultures, other
compelling and rich ways of generating meaning and giving structure to experience.”682 I
see this virtue as incorporating care insights regarding openness to others’ perspectives.
Notably, Berger writes that a sense of humility “arises from an appreciation of the role
that religious culture can play in identity, belonging, and the narration of a meaningful
and authentic story about one’s life. At the same time, this ethic is inspired by an
awareness of the limits of adjudication”.683 That is to say, it results from the recognition
that, “[e]ssential though their role may be, courts are never the only – and rarely the best
– institutional and social settings for appreciating and attending to the richness of the
676
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interests, subtleties of power, and need for creative solutions raised by issues of religious
identity, belonging, and difference.”684
Berger further breaks down the virtue of humility into “a triune: a humility about
the potential universality of law’s culture, about the capacity of law to understand other
cultural forms, and about the ultimate contingency of the privilege enjoyed by law’s
culture.”685 He associates such humility with “the sentiment that Cover hoped would
install itself in the judge who saw that the act of adjudication involves violence to other
rich worlds of meaning.”686 He points to Judith Resnick’s explanation that Cover wanted
judges and legal commentators “to be uncomfortable in their knowledge of their own
power, respectful of the legitimacy of competing legal systems, and aware of the
possibility that multiple meanings and divergent practise ought sometimes to be tolerated,
even if painfully so.”687 Humility incites legal actors to scrutinize the law’s symbolic and
normative assumptions, perceive power dynamics, and appreciate the law’s impact on—
and power over—other cultures and sources of law.688
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According to Clement, the ethical virtues of justice and care may at first glance
seem antithetical, but their “value arises precisely out of the tension between them.”689
And just as Clement posits that justice and care must act as mutual counterbalances,
Berger finds his “bicameral ethos”690 useful because “[t]he presence of both sentiments
means that neither aspect of this ethos of adjudication is permitted to run to its natural
extreme. Humility checks the risk that fidelity will turn to unreflective universalism.
Fidelity staves off a debilitating relativism of excess humility.”691
And that bicameral ethos, Berger continues, will in turn help judges to actively
cultivate indifference or tolerance,692 an endeavour that is “neither simple nor without
virtue.”693 Given that issues must be resolved within the constraints created by the power,
language, commitments, and limits of the law, Berger argues that, at times, “perhaps we
can do no better than to work to expand the borders of our indifference.”694
At the s. 1 analysis, for instance, courts may sometimes have difficulty weighing
the significance of a religious practice as it is valued by the adherent.695 Although courts
may not “understand” religion as its believers do, they can nevertheless “[seek] to create
space for religious practices at the margins of law”.696 The hope, Berger explains, is “that
those cultural manifestations one initially sees as foreign, objectionable, or intolerable
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might, with effort and reflection, be understood as untroubling to the law.”697 To make
room for the coexistence of other cultures, courts need to “carefully consider whether the
religious expression that is producing the apparent conflict can actually be satisfyingly
digested within the values and commitments of the rule of law.”698 Resnick expresses a
similar position when she writes that “judges have to rethink and recommit themselves to
their own understandings of foundational legal obligations. . . . [J]udges have to . . . shape
interpretations of the nation-state’s law that permit competing nomoi to live their visions
of obligation or to decide that the particular conflict requires a singular commitment and
conflicting legal regimes must be squelched.”699
In essence, Berger points out, “[l]aw asks itself to reconsider and reconfigure the
geography of indifference using its own categories, like the private/public, and its own
values, like autonomy and choice.”700 Therefore, he reasons, we are really only asking a
judge “to discharge his or her traditionally understood responsibility: to interpret. This
interpretation occurs as all interpretation does: by confronting what is unfamiliar and
seeking to understand it within a familiar conceptual framework, often through analogy
and metaphor.”701 A judge can find space for the religious belief or practice within the
law even “when the judge must furrow his or her brow in non-comprehension of the
religious culture but is, nevertheless, able to turn an unconcerned shoulder, satisfied that
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the practice or commitment at stake simply does not offend the culture of Canadian
constitutionalism.”702
Even if a judge concludes that a particular limit is justified, Berger’s bicameral
ethos leads to other significant consequences. Berger seeks “to re-narrate”703 the
conventional public story about the interaction between religion and Canadian
constitutionalism,704 according to which the law is neutral and autonomous from
culture.705 Berger asserts that this depoliticized706 narrative has proven to be inadequate
and disaffecting. For one thing, the conventional, “non-partisan, non-historical,
non-cultural”707 account of the law “[trades] in the currency of reasonableness.”708 That
is, it presents the law as being “based on some sense of what reasonable people would
view as fair and just”709 and conveys the impression that unsuccessful claimants are
simply unable to “see things reasonably”.710 For instance, Lessard argues that in B. (R.),
“[t]he norms of reasonableness invoked to justify the rejection of the B.’s claim
consistently presented dominant values as objective truths and the practices of established
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institutions as politically neutral technical expertise. Thus the result in the case appeared
inevitable and sensible without compromising the central value of individual liberty.”711
Berger describes as follows the pernicious effect of this narrative on religious
claimants:
The special alienation suffered by the religious claimant lies in the fact that, by
hiding the cultural nature of the rule of law, the conventional account denies a
salient reason for that loss. As a religious claimant, I lost not because the law has
cultural commitments that are at odds with mine – a result that might lead me to
politically engage and contest the partisan legal culture. Instead, neither my
culture nor that of the law was a factor in the legal result. Worse than disputed or
rejected, my culture is deemed immaterial. It is, of course, material to me; I am
conscious of its ineluctable influence on the structure of my experience of the
world and my sense of the good and true. Yet the conventional story precludes a
legal debate about those stakes, about culture. This severs me from the law as a
forum for public debate about what most concerns me and, hence, from an
important source of political community and social cohesion.712
Even victories become slightly bittersweet under the conventional account because
ultimately “culture was irrelevant to the legal conclusion.”713 Berger explains the
claimant’s perspective thus: “If my position is legally acceptable, it is so despite my
cultural commitments and only to the extent that I was capable of stripping my claims of
the terms that make it meaningful to me in the first place. . . . I am forced to reframe my
claim as one about reason and right, not about culture.”714
Berger argues that the conventional story also leads to “proxy debates”,715 when
the legal analysis obscures what is really at issue and results in “a form of sanitized legal
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discourse”.716 Common pitfalls include the s. 1 proportionality review, the evaluation of
the best interests of the child, and the assessment of harm.717 Berger does not claim that
courts should forego such analyses where they are relevant.718 What he denounces are
assessments that fail to “engage deeply with what is truly at stake on either side.”719 For
him, such impoverished and evasive “proxy debates become a normative shell game,
surreptitiously shifting around the more perplexing and fundamental questions raised by
the interaction of law and religion”.720
All in all, Berger summarizes, the conventional story can be deeply alienating.721
By contrast, a re-narrated and re-politicized story, animated by the virtues of fidelity and
humility, better maintains the relationship between law and different cultures, even if this
relationship may at times be characterized by discord. Berger argues that the more
transparent story “keeps the religious individual engaged in a part of the common social
practice of political debate and contestation.”722 Quoting Chantal Mouffe, he explains that
“it is better to have the religious actor as an ‘adversary’ rather than an alienated ‘enemy,’
cast outside the common social practices. Crucially, as adversaries, ‘while in conflict,
they see themselves as belonging to the same political association.’”723 His argument is
also consistent with Horwitz’s contention that citizens’ loyalty to the state and willingness
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to contribute to society are affected by the manner in which the state treats them.724
Horwitz reminds us that religious adherents may find themselves caught between the
“desire to be a good citizen and the ineluctable call to religious duty and obedience.”725
He reasons that “[i]f the language of the courts indicates a measure of indifference
toward, or lack of comprehension of, religion and its value, the courts will cease to
command the respect or obedience of many who would otherwise be valuable
citizens.”726 Therefore, regardless of the actual outcome of any particular case, judicial
reasons that show respect for religion will help to create and sustain stronger and healthier
societies.727
Berger’s bicameral ethos would, I believe, play a particularly compelling role at
the s. 1 stage, where the court’s analysis—while continuing to operate upon certain
normative assumptions728—becomes the most overtly contextual, as it attempts to balance
competing interests and examines the justification for restrictions. It seems to me that the
parent portrayed in La Forest J.’s reasons, one who makes “autonomous” decisions and
holds non-controversial religious beliefs, is an example of the normative approach
identified by Majury and Quéma, one that raises a category of individual “to a universal
level”,729 thereby legitimizing certain norms and marginalizing others.730 I see
La Forest J.’s analysis as initially delineating religious liberty against the backdrop of
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“the traditional structure of the family”731 and “well-established and customary social
hierarchies”,732 before excluding Sheena B.’s family from these categories by finding
their customs to be harmful and excessive and therefore subject to limits under s. 1.
Yet harm or risk of harm is a notoriously fluid concept. 733 As Beaman points out,
harm is “a ‘joker card’ that can be played by anyone in any context, and is being deployed
more and more frequently as a limiting mechanism for rights and freedoms in Charter
litigation.”734 Harm is also linked to children’s welfare and integrity, the conception of
which similarly “shifts over time and across value structures”,735 according to
Van Praagh. A court’s assessment of harm or excess, Beaman asserts, “is not an objective
exercise, despite the language of objectivity used to demarcate it.”736 In cases like B. (R.),
the various legal, medical, religious, and social interpretations of harm intersect 737 and
“expose a clash of norms.”738 Thus, Berger summarizes, “what ‘counts’ as harm depends
upon one’s normative system. . . . As such, the harm principle veils cultural conflict; it
holds off normative and interpretive questions by burying them under the second-order
issue of what qualifies as harm.”739 Consequently, recourse to the harm principle in the
assessment of limits must, in Beaman’s view, be accompanied by “the revelation of moral
assumptions about what is good, or right, or desirable.”740 The analysis must avoid
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“formalist and naturalizing subterfuge”,741 in Majury and Quéma’s words, and expose its
normative premises.742
Berger’s adjudicative virtues ask judges to eschew approaches that belie the
existence of normative clashes and that frame the context so as to exclude
non-mainstream groups, dismissing their beliefs as obviously harmful and minimizing the
effect of limitations. Judges should also be aware that, from the outset, “the secular nature
of s. 1 of the Charter privileges the state by requiring it to judge religion from the
perspective of secular interests and rationality.”743 In fact, Horwitz argues, the very
“language of s. 1, as expressed in the definitive case of R. v. Oakes, is the evaluative
language of rational liberalism. It focuses substantially on the reasonableness of the
state’s goals”.744 Parents with religious views, particularly non-mainstream ones, may
worry that a judge’s reasoning might be “informed by simple rationalist skepticism about
the very validity”745 of their claims, that the judge might too easily dismiss their beliefs
“as being less than rational in the light of clinical judgment”,746 and that the judge might
portray those beliefs as unreasonable and selfish.747 The fear is that a judge unable to
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ascribe to religion its value from the believer’s perspective might more readily support
the state’s ostensibly rational goals over the claimant’s religious commitments.748
“Humble” judges should therefore resist “viewing religion through the lens of the
unbeliever and treating it as a mysterious and threatening force that cannot be understood
by rational, secular reasoning and so must give way to the state’s rational goals.”749 To
avoid alienating believers and truly engage with the interests at stake, they should seek to
appreciate the meaning and value of such practices from the believers’ perspective and
strive to fairly and accurately describe the claims in the believers’ own terms.750
It may not always be easy to accord a belief its full value as seen from the
claimant’s point of view; for instance, “it may be difficult to give full credit to the
concept of damnation, because it could become an automatic exemption from any further
consideration of the importance of the state’s goals.”751 And as Diana Ginn observes,
courts are in no position to assess the “truth” of a religious claim “or to predict the future
spiritual direction of the child. Courts are, therefore, right to work with the evidence
available to them—the seriousness of the medical condition and the impact of the
proposed treatment.”752 But they should remember that the way in which they treat such
claims matters, and that case law “not based upon an understanding of the values
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involved is likely to be perceived as shallow, inconsistent, and nonpersuasive.”753 A judge
might therefore give reasons why the state cannot endorse a particular belief or practice,
while nonetheless recognizing its significance for the believer.754
Like Berger, Lessard believes that there is a heavy price to the oversimplification
of the stakes at play; in her opinion, “to the extent that complexities were simplified,
diverse conceptions of community rendered invisible, and deeply held values dismissed
as foolhardy or irrational, the R.(B.) decision represents a defeat for all members of the
Canadian polity in terms of the impoverishment of our political discourse.”755 By
contrast, Van Praagh asserts, a more complete picture would reflect “[t]he impact, both
positive and enriching, and negative and harmful, of religious communities on their
children.”756 In fact, Moon argues, the value and harm of a right like religious freedom
are not polar opposites but rather two sides of the same coin, resulting from the relational
nature of religion.757 When a court assesses the impact of religion, it “is not simply
balancing the distinct interests of separate individuals”;758 instead, it is “making a
contextual judgment about the relative value/harm”759 of religion, “or about the character
or quality of the . . . relationship.”760
Consequently, judges should conduct harm assessments from multiple angles.761
They might for instance acknowledge that, for a parent, religion is not just about choice
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and self-realization; it also creates bonds between parents, children, families, and
communities, and nourishes communities. The parents’ invocation of their right “is
intertwined with the resistance of the religious body”762 and community as a whole.
Judges might also recognize the distress that the state-mandated treatment causes to the
child, parents, and their relationship;763 the spiritual harm inflicted upon the child in the
eyes of believers (including the child as a potential adult adherent); the community’s
inability to practise its beliefs;764 as well as the community’s “position in society
generally as a minority religious group”.765 They might be mindful of the extent to which
“children’s sense of religious affiliation and identity develops through their relationships
with their parents and religious communities”766 and note the potential loss of
connections767—among child, family, and community—resulting from state intervention.
They might consider, in addition to the medical risk, “other interests such as the child’s
psychological well-being, the impact of the medical decision on the life of the child as a
whole, and its impact on family relations or on third parties”. 768 Bridge advises judges to
perceive “[p]arental religious and cultural freedoms and the value these represent for the
child . . . as contributing towards but not ultimately constituting best interests.”769
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A “humble” judge might also be aware that judicial reasoning, as Lynn Hagger
points out, often portrays the interests of parents and children as being in conflict with
each other.770 Courts should therefore attempt to reflect in their reasons a more nuanced
portrait of family relations, one that acknowledges parents’ concurrent commitments to
their religious beliefs and to their child.771 In B. (R.), Van Praagh argues, the assumption
of conflicting interests sent the parents the message “that they had to choose between
those commitments; they were then told they had chosen wrongly.”772 Because of their
religious commitments, the parents “became, in the eyes of the law, a large part of the
risk to their baby’s health and life.”773 However, Van Praagh reminds us, it was not that
they “chose” death for their child; it was that they believed that Sheena would suffer a
worse harm if she had the transfusion; in the parents’ view, the Court simply “substituted
its opinion of Sheena’s best interests for their own”.774 Even when courts are persuaded
by the state’s arguments, they should not fail to recognize, where appropriate, “the
parents’ genuinely held beliefs that they are acting in the child’s best interests”.775
Bridgeman suggests that “it would be instructive to listen to the parents of sick children,
health care professionals and lawyers acting in partnership in order to secure the
well-being of the child”776 and to hear “the ‘different voice’ . . . in what they say”.777
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Rather than approaching the best-interests assessment as “an adversarial battle”,778 courts
should acknowledge “the shared endeavour of parents, professionals and the judges to do
what is best for the child.”779
Berger’s bicameral ethos may also inspire more creative and just remedies.
Lessard argues that La Forest J.’s vision of family relationships “distorts and limits the
creative and remedial potential of the law.”780 Likewise, Van Praagh sees in B. (R.) a
“failure to find creative remedies”,781 given that even “[t]hough the threat to her health
came from her parents’ refusal to consent to the blood transfusion, the state’s response
was to suspend, for the period of the wardship, all the ties between Sheena, her parents,
and by extension, her community.”782
Horwitz contends that, by contrast, judges who take the value of the religious
belief seriously will “seek the least restrictive means of interference with religion”.783
When they make efforts to minimize the perceived incompatibility between law and
religion, they may create a larger space of toleration within which both can coexist.
Van Praagh adds that “[j]ust as a spectrum of remedies under the rubric of intervention
can be imagined and encouraged, so can a spectrum of interactions among normative
orders in people’s lives.”784 Judges should not assume that the commitments of the
religious believer are irreconcilable with those of Canadian constitutionalism.785
Moreover, Van Praagh notes, norms “are constantly shifting and interacting and
778
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evolving”,786 as evidenced by attempts made by health professionals to consider options
that avoid blood transfusions (thereby lessening the frequency of conflict between
families and child protection officials)787 and their attempts to involve religious leaders in
discussions in search of a consensus regarding treatment.788 It is, Van Praagh observes,
“in imagining a continual interaction among sets of norms and expectations, values and
practices that the definition of child well-being can slowly be worked out.”789
A relational approach to remedies would acknowledge the potential for both
perceived good and harm to come out of attachments, and consider the possibility that
“[r]esponsive remedies may require co-operation from the very communities within
which harm is inflicted upon children”.790 More specifically, Van Praagh writes, “[t]he
form of intervention should reflect the law’s best attempt to hold on to and foster the
positive links, while targeting and trying to change the negative.” 791 She suggests for
instance that a more appropriate response in B. (R.) might have been “to think about some
kind of ‘cooperative venture,’ where the Bs would retain the other responsibilities,
connections and rights of parenting, but the Children’s Aid Society would have the ability
to consent to the medical treatment.”792
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Recognition of the interconnected nature of families, communities, and the state
raises a further point with regard to remedies and intervention. As Van Praagh observes,
the real concern in cases like B. (R.) was not “the ‘intervention or not’ problem”.793 Even
though the issue was framed as “decision-making formally couched in the language of
parental rights”,794 the case was really about “how the state can and should intervene.”795
La Forest J. sketched a portrait of the family wherein the interests of children were
deemed to coincide with those of the decision-maker, whose right to freedom or
autonomy acted as a shield against state interference. The traditional qualities of this
neoconservative synthesis, as identified by Lessard, hark back to an era where the family
was consigned to the purely private domain.796 But relational theory blurs the line
between the private and the public, and between the individual and collective, and helps
to show how “the interests of parents, children, and government/community are often
inter-related and/or all at stake in different ways.”797 A relational approach would
recognize that children are members of “overlapping communities”798 and that “the state
and parent are jointly responsible for a child’s well-being.”799 Consequently the focus
shifts from individual protection against state interference towards the state’s positive
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duties to promote healthy relationships throughout its interactions with individuals,
families, and communities.800
These relational premises explain why I find problematic Iacobucci and
Major JJ.’s view that there was no need to balance (under s. 1) “the interests of
the state against the rights violation of the aggrieved individual”.801 In their opinion, the
only interests at stake were “Sheena’s right to life and security of the person and her
parents’ right to freedom of religion.”802 From this angle, the case did not “involve
conflicts between individual rights and state interests”803 and thus did not necessitate a
broad definition of the liberty interest and recourse to s. 1 for justification of the limits.
Even the majority’s acceptance that it is “inappropriate to allow an agency of the state to
invoke the Charter of Rights to limit the rights of citizens”804 overlooks the intertwined
nature of the various interests and the joint responsibility of the state and parents to
ensure a child’s well-being.805 As Joan Small points out, in certain cases involving a
child’s welfare, “absent state intervention, the infant’s rights remain illusory at best.”806
Surely, she argues, “the state has an obligation to act”,807 to safeguard Charter rights, and
to speak for the child, where necessary.808 The state’s interest becomes especially evident
at s. 1, where, in protection cases, “the agency can advance its ‘interest’ in protecting
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children in answer to parental claims”.809 Consequently, any analysis of the limits
imposed on parental rights to liberty and religious freedom “should incorporate and
balance individuals, communities and state in the context of a shared commitment to ‘our’
children and future.”810
Ultimately, s. 1 plays an important role in recognizing the impact of legal
decisions on communities.811 When judges balance different interests and assess harm
under s. 1, they “incorporate the normative conflicts between the state and religious
communities.”812 How they treat beliefs and practices in their judicial opinions has a
correspondingly significant impact on adherents and communities: Van Praagh argues
that “the ‘legal consciousness’ of adults and children changes; they perceive of their lives
and relations in a new way, informed by the judgment of the state.” 813 If a court orders
“medically prescribed treatment . . . for children without regard for the perceived
negative impact on their souls, the message is clear to the affected religious communities.
Their authority is overruled and the children who belong to them in a meaningful way are
claimed by outsiders guarding against the detrimental effects of community
affiliation.”814
By contrast, a court that is more “humble” and “caring”—and therefore more
just—sends a different message to communities. When courts give voice to those
communities’ beliefs and show that they are open to trying to understand religion on its
own terms, the law shows that it will strive to “contemplate and make room for religious
809
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identity and affiliation in the everyday lives of its subjects and, in doing so, co-exists with
multiple alternative normative systems.”815 And, Van Praagh writes, “[i]f the adherents to
a religion are taken seriously by the Charter, then their religious communities are
indirectly recognized. Recognizing ‘individuals’ as opposed to ‘communities’ is not the
strict dichotomy it might at first seem.”816 Allowing for a more complex portrait of the
role of religion in the “multi-faceted relationship among children, parents, communities,
and the state”817 is one more way in which courts can “acknowledge the inherent tension
between the collective and the individual and find means of mediating as well as
sustaining the tension.”818
Greater insistence upon attachments, contextualism, transparent normative
premises, humility, and empathy can alter the tone of the judicial narrative—and, by
extension, shape public perception of the communities being written about and their
relationship with the state. Berger highlights one field of study in particular that, at its
core, centres on “the dynamics of cross-cultural encounter and the cultural force of state
law”:819 Indigenous legal scholarship. Indeed, he writes, “[s]titched into the very fabric of
this scholarship is the insistence that constitutional analysis must grapple with what it
means to take culture seriously.”820 For this reason, Berger is inspired by the “conceptual
allegiances”821 between ss. 2(a) and 35(1) and by what the study of law and religion can
learn from Indigenous legal scholarship, given the latter’s “insistent focus on the quality
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of relationships between and among groups as the controlling question of constitutional
law, rather than the distracting question of law’s fidelity to its own abstractions.”822
In turn, Berger’s bicameral adjudicative virtues and the integration of justice and
care may offer Indigenous legal scholars some food for thought. These concepts call
attention to the power of “the normative rules that structure contextual approaches”823 and
caution against “defining the otherness of marginalised people.”824 Relational theory can
promote a more meaningful definition of autonomy, one that underscores the role of
relationship825 and “the sociopolitical situatedness of autonomous groups”.826
4.2.2

A More Relational Perspective of Aboriginal Rights
The Supreme Court of Canada, as we have seen, has held that “aboriginal rights

. . . arise from the fact that aboriginal people are aboriginal.”827 More specifically, they
arise from the fact that “when Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal peoples
were already here, living in communities on the land, and participating in distinctive
cultures, as they had done for centuries.”828 From this premise, Manley-Casimir posits
that Aboriginal rights can generally “be understood as embodying the concept of respect
for difference”.829 This notion of intercultural respect tallies with Turpel’s view that when
Indigenous people make rights claims, “they are using the discourse of human rights . . .

822

Ibid.
Leckey, supra note 390 at 81.
824
Heather McDonald, “Culture in Health Research and Practice” in Ian Anderson, Fran Baum & Michael
Bentley, eds, Beyond Bandaids: Exploring the Underlying Social Determinants of Aboriginal Health
(Darwin, Australia: Cooperative Research Centre for Aboriginal Health, 2007) 255 at 259.
825
Ibid at 205.
826
Ibid at 200.
827
Van der Peet, supra note 10 at para 19 [emphasis in original].
828
Ibid at para 30.
829
Manley-Casimir, supra note 213 at 164.
823

128

as an instrument for the recognition of historical claims of cultural difference.” 830 She
sees these rights claims as “requests for the recognition by the dominant (European)
culture of the existence of another, and for toleration of, and respect for, the practical
obstacles that the request brings with it.”831
According to Christie, the “condition of difference”832 that Turpel describes
requires that non-Indigenous people stop trying “to impose universal visions of the nature
of knowledge, the self and its relation to community”.833 In particular, Manley-Casimir
argues, the future of Indigenous and non-Indigenous relationships depends upon a form of
respect characterized by care principles: “care respect”834 entails “valuing and responding
to others in their concrete particularity;”835 “coming to understand them in light of their
own self-conceptions and trying to see the world from their point of view;”836 and “caring
for others by responding to their needs, promoting their well-being, and participating in
the realization of their selves and their ends.”837
I see compatibility between these attitudes and Berger’s virtue of humility “about
the potential universality of law’s culture, about the capacity of law to understand other
cultural forms, and about the ultimate contingency of the privilege enjoyed by law’s
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culture.”838 Legal actors who are humble may open themselves to being “uncomfortable
in their knowledge of their own power, respectful of the legitimacy of competing legal
systems, and aware of the possibility that multiple meanings and divergent practise ought
sometimes to be tolerated, even if painfully so.”839 Such sentiments of discomfort,
respect, and awareness may be useful, I believe, in allaying some of the apprehensions
expressed by Turpel and Christie.
But Turpel also asks whether a judge can really “know a value which is part of an
Aboriginal culture and not of her own”840—or, indeed, whether “anyone can know the
basic differences as opposed to identifying difference”.841 In her opinion, “[s]ensitivity to
cultural difference is sensitivity to the limitation of the capacity to know.”842
If called upon to adjudicate Aboriginal rights claims, judges working within the
framework of Canadian constitutionalism may engage in what Berger calls
“interpretation-as-translation”:843 “a strong form of understanding whereby the judge is
able to re-describe the practice or commitment in terms that make it consistent with or
familiar to the culture of the law.”844 Berger sees examples of this process occurring in
certain spheres of Indigenous law; he notes how “John Borrows has persuasively shown
the manner in which translation, close listening, and conceptual agility can help to make
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Indigenous

legal
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non-Indigenous Canadian law.”845
But Berger has also clarified that such translation is not strictly necessary for the
cultivation of indifference. A judge who is simply able to interpret a foreign practice in a
manner that “does not trouble or challenge the law’s constitutive commitments, intuitions,
or practices”846 will be able to “[stay] the culturally forceful hand of the law”847 and
create space for that practice, even “when the judge must furrow his or her brow in
non-comprehension of the religious culture”.848
Through his theory of justice as translation, James Boyd White, too, addresses the
impossibility—for law, as for all languages—of ever fully understanding a different
language, culture, or experience. He suggests that jurists should acknowledge this
limitation and strive to “respect those differences even when we can only dimly perceive
them.”849 He theorizes that all human interaction inevitably involves translation, “the art
of . . . confronting unbridgeable discontinuities between texts, between languages, and
between people.”850 Translation therefore requires that one recognize the other “as a
center of meaning apart from oneself”;851 appreciate that one’s response will never
accurately represent the other; and acknowledge that inadequacy in what one says.852
Translation is relational, a way of attempting “to be oneself in relation to an always
845
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imperfectly known and imperfectly knowable other who is entitled to a respect equal to
our own.”853 For White, this “ethic of the translator”854 provides a useful framework for
judging.855
The difficulty that Berger and White grapple with—the construction and
affirmation of another’s distinctiveness through the vehicle of one’s own language—is a
point of contention for a number of Indigenous legal scholars. Berger identifies the
problem broadly as “one of the conundrums of cross-cultural adjudication: it demands
engaging with and seeking to interpret the cultural other but necessarily from within, and
in a manner intelligible to, the culture of law.”856 Religious applicants may discover that
claims lose their meaning if transposed inadequately into a liberal legal terminology of
“reason and right”.857 Indigenous communities also find themselves compelled to
refashion their concerns and demands using the language of Canadian constitutionalism,
even though its terms “may distort or misdescribe the claim they would wish to make if it
were expressed in their own languages.”858 But for commentators like Turpel working
within the unique context of Aboriginal rights, the “conundrum” assumes the form of a
particularly grievous contradiction between, on the one hand, the Canadian state’s
intention of recognizing Indigenous peoples as distinct peoples and, on the other hand, its
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requirement that the “distinctness be expressed through something called Aboriginal
rights defined by Canadian law”.859
For Joshua Nichols, this paradox underscores the importance of the space that lies
beyond translation. He views the principle of reconciliation as having evolved to
recognize “a multiplicity of sovereignties”;860 at least two voices must now be heard in
any assessment of the law’s validity, the “single imperial voice” 861 no longer sufficing. If
it is to become a truly mutual process,862 he argues, reconciliation requires more than the
exclusive reframing of “the aboriginal perspective”863 into “terms cognizable to the
Canadian legal and constitutional structure.”864 Courts cannot rely “solely on
translation”865 and must favour approaches that allow the law to be crafted “in and
through a lateral process of communication.”866 Nichols senses promise in a judicial
approach that “relies heavily upon evidence and judicial discretion”867 in such a way as to
“[open] up a space for the Aboriginal perspective to be heard.”868
Berger’s adjudicative virtues and White’s ethic of the translator may allow for
more situations in which the capacity to identify and respect difference, without fully
understanding it, may be enough. They might, in this sense, begin to answer Christie’s
call for a “[theory] of respect and tolerance grounded in acknowledgment of [its] own
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cultural limits and the potential danger posed by ignoring such limits”.869 The trajectory
of the Supreme Court’s case law has proven deeply unsatisfactory to Christie, who is
highly critical of what he sees as the Court’s perpetuation of a “colonial narrative”870 in
its construction of Aboriginal rights, one that fails to include Indigenous perspectives or
capture the true essence of their interests. Christie declares that moving forward,
Canadian courts must cease imposing their visions upon Indigenous peoples. To the
extent that these courts continue to adjudicate such disputes, they should be steered by the
principles of reconciliation, care, and justice towards approaches that prioritize dialogue,
accord value and space to Indigenous voices, and avoid the distortion of Indigenous
self-defined needs and demands.
The addition of a relational perspective to an analysis of parental autonomy in the
Aboriginal rights context creates further nuances. Section 35 constitutes a particularly
vivid illustration of the dual individual-collective nature of rights, and parental decision
making about medical care can correspondingly be viewed as “a microcosm with
macro-implications.”871 That is to say, Hamilton might be seen as emphasizing one First
Nations mother’s right to choose traditional medicines for her child, but that narrative is
but one strand woven within a larger story about group autonomy and jurisdiction.
Macklem makes the connection between s. 35(1) and autonomy in proposing that
s. 35(1) be read “as affirming a sphere of autonomy for native people over those matters
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that are central to their individual and collective self-definition.”872 Fiona MacDonald
acknowledges that a number of Indigenous scholars continue to issue “strong and perhaps
prominent calls for indigenous autonomy defined as separation, or ‘turning away’ from
the Canadian state”;873 nevertheless, she observes, certain others, most notably John
Borrows and Dale Turner, are of the opinion that “an autonomous Aboriginal nation
would encounter a geography, history, economics and politics that requires participation
with Canada and the world to secure its objectives.”874
However, “separation” is not necessarily antithetical to the concept of autonomy if
the relational account indeed allows agents to “extricate themselves from bad
relationships as well as to transform the structures that shaped those relationships.”875
From this perspective, D.H.’s leaving of the jurisdiction with her daughter prior to the
hearing of the case876 might be interpreted as a deployment of relational autonomy’s
“emancipatory power”877 if the departure was prompted by a belief that the Canadian
legal system represented a threat to her parental autonomy or the view that the state’s
authority over Indigenous autonomy in child welfare matters was illegitimate, oppressive
872
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or unjust.878 The reconceptualization of autonomy to include a social element does not
foreclose the possibility that one’s autonomy may be jeopardized in some cases by others’
individual or collective choices.879 And, according to Nedelsky, the capacity to be
autonomous cannot exist “in the absence of the feeling or experience of being
autonomous.”880 That is to say, autonomy can be destroyed by the feeling of
powerlessness,881 by subjection “to the arbitrary and damaging power of others.”882 But if
justice is to set limits to protect parties in relationships from harm and ensure their
capacity to be autonomous, in the context of Indigenous law, the underlying question
persists: whose justice is to set these limits?
Indigenous people have had good reason to fear state oppression and injustice. As
Marlee Kline points out, the “long and continuing struggle by many First Nations to
regain control over child protection”883 must be situated “within the context of the
historically specific and disproportionately destructive impact that dominant child welfare
regimes have had on First Nations people and communities”.884 First Nations autonomy
with regard to child and family services will remain unsatisfactory, she predicts, as long
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as those past and present colonialist practices that contribute to the need for such services
are not also addressed. In this sense, she concludes, “the welfare of First Nations children
cannot be separated from the more general welfare of First Nations.”885
Relational theory stresses the relation-structuring function of rights,886 and
MacDonald suggests that group autonomy should be understood as demanding the
exposure of “relations of power”887 and the effective empowerment of entities in their
interactions with one another.888 In particular, she writes, “the ability to act autonomously
must include not only being accountable for oneself but also the ability to hold others to
account.”889 Testifying to the continued need to hold the Canadian state to account, for
instance, a 2016 decision of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal concluded that
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada had discriminated against First
Nations children and families living on reserve and in the Yukon in the provision of child
and family services and, more specifically, in the provision of inequitable and insufficient
funding for those services.890 In its decision, the Tribunal explicitly recognized that First
Nations children and families are and “have been adversely impacted by the Government
of Canada’s past and current child welfare practices on reserves.”891
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Kline has identified how Canadian courts, “as institutions of the dominant
society,”892 have also committed injustices against Indigenous peoples in employing
“dominant ideological representations of First Nations”893 that devalue Indigenous
practices. At times courts have attempted to adopt flexible, contextual approaches to the
recognition of differences, thereby apparently challenging “certain devaluative
representations of First Nations ways of life by recognizing their equal validity with those
of the dominant society.”894 However, Kline and Patricia Monture warn that a court
purporting to take a contextual approach must avoid actually misconstruing “the issue as
one of cultural difference”895 using “ethnocentric stereotypes . . . to shape the definition
of ‘community differences.’”896 Kline asserts that, to truly promote these communities’
autonomy in a respectfully contextual manner, courts must, where relevant, directly
recognize the colonialist roots of a particular issue, and ensure that the communities are
supported as needed “to confront and develop solutions to contemporary conditions and
circumstances rooted in colonialist policies and practices of the past.”897
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In her reading of Indigenous child welfare cases, Kline further detects
“individualizing and obfuscating effects”898 within the dominant ideology of motherhood
and the liberal discourse of “choice;” as a result, “choice” is often “presented in abstract
and simplified terms”899 and constraints in women’s lives overlooked, making options
“appear viable.”900 She contends that a change in ideology can come about only with
improvements to “the material conditions and power relations responsible for its
production and reproduction.”901
In his own work, Berger has also shown how assessments of harm or the best
interests of a child can result in proxy debates. In some cases, “harm” or “best interests of
the child” has been used as “a normative placeholder that offers a safe ground for
resolving the issue”.902 Such an approach camouflages cultural and ideological
disagreements over what really counts as a “cognizable ‘interest’”903 for a specific child,
and Kline has denounced its use in the context of First Nations child welfare, calling
attention to the damage wrought by reliance on a decontextualized, “universal”904 best
interests standard that views “the child as an abstracted individual whose interests are
severable from those of her extended family, community, and First Nation.”905 In her
opinion, this “liberal ideological form of the best interests standard has served to . . .
minimize, and even negate in some instances, the relevance and importance of
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maintaining a child’s First Nations identity and culture”,906 thereby making the removal
of the child appear more “natural, necessary, and legitimate”.907
In addition to drawing attention to hidden normative assumptions, Berger’s
adjudicative virtues enjoin judges to be humble about the limits of law’s culture, to be
wary of law’s power, to be respectful of other cultures, and to be “aware of the possibility
that multiple meanings and divergent practise ought sometimes to be tolerated, even if
painfully so.”908 Manley-Casimir’s discussion of “care respect” in the context of
Aboriginal rights seems to coincide with Berger’s notion of humility. In particular, care
respect encourages judges to create “space for Indigenous storytelling within courts”,909
so as to honour, listen to, and learn from Indigenous peoples. Indigenous claimants should
be afforded the opportunity and agency to establish their identity on their own terms, and
judges should avoid “[taking] on themselves the task of defining the otherness”910 of
Indigenous people.
Care respect also means not discounting the value of emotion and affect in
decision making.911 Just as Berger makes a link between humility and discomfort,
Manley-Casimir asserts that in order to truly hear others’ stories, empathetic judges must
be open to their own emotions and unease, and avoid “silencing Indigenous peoples by
failing to recognize the relevance of their pain to the issues in dispute, reinforcing
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unequal power relations, and preventing non-Indigenous people, including judges, from
engaging in creative acts that are deeply transformative.”912 Moreover, judges must be
sensitive to the emotions Indigenous peoples express, given that feelings of autonomy are
essential for the capacity to be autonomous, and given that a focus on such feelings
acknowledges “as authoritative the voices of those whose autonomy is at issue”913 and
helps judges to effectively support and protect Indigenous autonomy.
Additionally, Manley-Casimir calls on judges to “engage their moral imagination
in making decisions involving Aboriginal claims.”914 In doing so, they may be able “to
imagine that multiple realities and worldviews can exist simultaneously without the need
to impose colonial views on Indigenous peoples.”915 Similar to the value and tension
created by the integration of fidelity and humility, the moral imagination might “enable a
Canadian judge to question the basis and legitimacy of the Canadian state’s assertion of
sovereignty without requiring the corresponding dismantling of the state.”916 It might
lead, Manley-Casimir suggests, “to the creation of mutually agreed dispute resolution
mechanisms that create dialogue and transform Indigenous/non-Indigenous relationships
from those based on violence and coercion to those based on mutual respect.”917
Borrows points to examples of creative and respectful mechanisms in Canadian
jurisdictions where “traditional Aboriginal practices regarding justice [have been]
modified to interact with courtroom procedures.”918 In his opinion, the incorporation of
912
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First Nations laws and practices into Canadian law represents a valuable contribution and
helps to counteract the biases and clout of non-Aboriginal laws,919 making “the law truly
Canadian and, as a result, more equitable and fair.”920 Notably, Borrows suggests that a
greater awareness of Indigenous law may also assist judges in engaging with Indigenous
“spirituality on its own terms and could help the courts take a more self-reflexive and
self-conscious stance in their work”921—in other words, show more humility.
In the medical decision-making context, judges who adopt the virtue of humility
might afford Indigenous people greater space to define their own identities. By embracing
such accounts and using their moral imagination, judges might recognize that health
systems and the biomedical model of illness are not a-cultural;922 they might envisage the
existence of multiple world views and “alternative modernities”923 in a way that avoids
making “Indigenous people . . . strangers to their experiences of sickness and health”.924
With the respect he showed to D.H.’s practices and his refusal to subordinate her
views to “the western medical paradigm”,925 Edward J. seemingly avoided the
“devaluative”926 ideological representations that Kline condemns. His Endorsement
further showcases an instance in which multiple world views and modernities were
allowed to coexist. The Government of Ontario listened to the family and community,
choosing respect, dialogue, and cooperation over further conflict, with all parties working
919
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together to offer J.J. the best treatment possible.927 The approach they took “recognizes
the province’s acceptance of the family’s right to practice traditional medicine and the
family’s acceptance western medicine will most certainly help their daughter.” 928 The
amended reasons now also confirm the child’s distinct (but interdependent) identity and
interests, and explicitly acknowledge that “[t]he aboriginal right to use traditional
medicine must be respected, and must be considered, among other factors, in any analysis
of the best interests of the child, and whether the child is in need of protection.”929 As
such, the reasons are consistent with Bridgeman’s position that courts, just as much as
parents, must “undertake full consideration of the best interests of [a] particular child”930
and avoid focusing on one aspect of the child’s well-being to the exclusion of others.
However, the initial assessment of whether D.H.’s decision made J.J. a child in
need of protection was never fully fleshed out. Edward J.’s question (which he answered
in the affirmative) was “whether D.H.’s decision, as J.J.’s substitute decision-maker, to
pursue traditional medicine is in fact an aboriginal right to be recognized and
affirmed.”931 But that question is not quite the same as asking whether D.H. had a
“constitutionally protected right to pursue their traditional medicine over the applicant’s
stated course of treatment of chemotherapy”,932 as it was phrased in the conclusion. The
constitutional right to use one type of medicine does not necessarily preclude the
simultaneous need for another treatment; the administration of the latter treatment does
not automatically constitute an infringement of the right. And the question of what a child
927
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needs is not automatically answered by a determination of what her parent’s rights are.
From the relational perspective, it would be premature to terminate an inquiry into a
child’s best interests following a conclusion that her parent or community had a right,
even a right to autonomy, if autonomy is to be understood as the capacity for agency
within social relations.
For the sake of discussion, let us suppose that a court holds that it is in a child’s
best interests to receive a particular treatment, the child’s parents have an Aboriginal right
to use traditional medicines, and that right has been infringed. What might constitute a
legitimate limit to such a right? Any government regulation that infringes upon an
Aboriginal right must be justified, so as to reconcile the state’s legislative power with its
duty towards Indigenous peoples, and reconcile “Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
Canadians in a mutually respectful long-term relationship”.933
In her thesis, Manley-Casimir applies a relational framework to the duty to consult
and accommodate, with the aim of helping judges and government actors pursue the goal
of reconciliation. Judges, she suggests, can promote more creative remedies and dialogue
by “supporting the operation of flexible platforms to facilitate the resolution of disputes
involving Indigenous/non-Indigenous disputes.”934 They can “examine with care the way
in which the consultation processes were designed and the extent to which such processes
were the result of collaborative efforts between the affected Indigenous community,
government, and industry.”935
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The consulting parties should have been able to consider government
accommodations to redress any historical grievances;936 this process contextualizes the
process and “supports a constructive consideration of the past in shaping present and
future relationships.”937 The state must recognize that power imbalances require
rectification and “opportunities for dialogue . . . in which autonomous groups can
continually address the medium of their autonomy as well as any ongoing or new
obligations and responsibilities that arise between agents.”938
A court might also “consider whether the consultation process provided
opportunities for community members to tell their stories and interact directly with
government and industry officials.”939 State officials should have made efforts “to enter
into relationship with Indigenous leaders and community members and attempt[ed] to
genuinely

understand

the

harms

from

their

perspectives.”940

The

emphasis,

Manley-Casimir writes, “is on creating personal, empathetic connections between the
parties so that each parties’ concerns and perspectives are shared and inform the process
and decision-making.”941 These “positive obligations on the Canadian government to
engage in dialogue with Indigenous peoples”942 are consistent with the principle of
reconciliation943 and the need for case law made “in and through a lateral process of
communication.”944
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Ultimately, the issue in Hamilton seems to have been resolved in an exemplary
manner, reflecting an approach that ostensibly illustrates many of the qualities discussed,
such as respect, cooperation, dialogue, and the integration of multiple practices and world
views. The parties’ interactions suggest that efforts were made to build relationships,
maintain ties, involve community members, listen to different perspectives, and create
empathetic connections. The parties’ apparent willingness to come together, engage the
moral imagination, and make possible the coexistence of world views resulted in a
solution that seems to have allowed the Government of Ontario to discharge its
responsibilities while respecting the exercise of D.H.’s and her community’s rights. An
optimistic observer might consider that the approach ultimately joined together members
of different groups, including health professionals and state representatives, “in a
community of mutual concern and mutual aid, through an appreciation of individuality
and interdependence.”945
Finally, in its dealings with Indigenous peoples, the state should remember that its
attitude towards a community will be revealed through its treatment of that community’s
children,946 and intervention in the lives of children, parents, and communities without
consideration of their perspective sends the message that “[t]heir authority is overruled
and the children who belong to them in a meaningful way are claimed by outsiders
guarding against the detrimental effects of community affiliation.”947 In fact, Van Praagh
notes, “[t]he most stark example”948 of this link between children and a community’s
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survival lies in Canada’s history of residential schools.949 It is a dark legacy that bares
truth to the intertwined nature of individual and collective interests950 and the connection
between the vitality of Indigenous communities and their effective exercise of autonomy,
understood as the ability to define their own identities and live by that definition.
Children are members of many different communities, each of which plays a role in
contributing to their well-being. In the case of Indigenous children and parents, a
relational account of autonomy demands scrupulous scrutiny and full accounting of the
manner in which the state exercises its authority and honours its obligations to their
communities.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
For many of the authors examined above, the ultimate significance of a judicial
opinion lies not in any specific ruling, although results evidently matter a great deal. In
this regard, the theme recurring throughout this thesis—encompassing the notion of the
relational self, the integration of care and justice, and Berger’s bicameral ethos—
resonates at multiple levels. Hamilton and B. (R.) were chosen as the backdrop to this
thesis not necessarily to emphasize their outcomes, pronounce upon the legitimacy of
state action in any particular case, or contrast the doctrinal analyses of ss. 2(a) and 35(1).
Rather, they serve to highlight the importance of the underlying text and the manner in
which it treats and conceptualizes its subjects.951 White contends that of greater value
than the outcome arrived at is the question of whether “the opinion establishes an
appropriate relation with the prior texts to which it owes fidelity, with the reader, and
with those other people that it talks about”.952 He urges readers to evaluate an opinion,
determine the meaning of justice, and locate law’s authority in terms of conversation,
voice, attitude, character, and relations—that is, “who we are to each other in our talk and
in our lives.”953 He argues that law is fundamentally about “voices and relations: what
voices does the law allow to be heard, what relations does it establish among them? With
what voice, or voices, does the law itself speak?”954 In his view, the law’s treatment of
those it talks about will reflect—poorly or favourably—upon the law itself.955 Horwitz
similarly ties the authority and legitimacy of the law to the relationship it establishes with
951
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its readers, such that its treatment of people’s deeply cherished values and commitments
will affect their loyalty to the state and desire to contribute to society.956 Ultimately, for
White, “the heart of justice is . . . relational”,957 to be found in the way we “regard and
speak to one another”.958
The importance of voice and attitude extends to the way in which the law talks
about itself and its relationship with citizens, groups, and other cultures. One leitmotif
throughout this thesis has been the theme of stories and myths: the “myth” of liberal
individualism;959 the “autonomy myth”;960 the “critique of the myth of the ‘isolated
individual’”;961 “the myth of the self-made man”;962 and the conventional story about
law’s autonomy from culture,963 criticized by Berger and labelled a “mythological
narrative” by Sullivan, Yelle, and Taussig.964
The label of “myth” may, at one level, be understood as denoting “a false
statement, an opinion popularly held”965 but shown by experts to be inaccurate. However,
the concept of myth involves several levels of meaning,966 not the least of which is,
according to Robert Taylor, the portrayal of “images, metaphors and symbol systems
956
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which comprise the stories or narrative accounts by which we direct our lives”.967 Colin
Grant, too, describes myths as comprehensive stories and perspectives that shape life and
define reality, often at a level so fundamental as to go unnoticed.968 Hence, “[a]ny world
view . . . is a mythic structure.”969 Myths function to some extent like glasses, Grant
suggests, enabling us to see and make sense of the world, 970 and “[t]o identify something
as myth is . . . to have stepped outside of its own perspective”971—in other words, to have
removed one’s glasses.972 But the conundrum of course is that “[t]here is no view from no
where”,973 and “[w]e are always looking out from some perspective”,974 some
mythological structure.
If these stories—such as those that tell of the meaning of autonomy, the value to
be accorded to different practices, or the nature of relationships—turn out to be
inadequate, Berger argues, they must be retold, for “[t]hey have implications for the way
in which society is shaped. Equipped with these narratives that lend a particular
significance or meaning to the phenomena of social life, we are led to act in particular
ways, judge in particular fashions, and thus to create particular political realities.” 975 In
light of these tangible effects created by stories, the commentators surveyed throughout
this thesis urge jurists not only to make judicious choices in the narratives they absorb
and retell, but also to take care in the telling of their own stories.
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It seems to me that judicial opinions can themselves be read as myths; the issues
they examine are “stated within a legal context but ultimately point beyond to the realm
of world view.”976 Law is about storytelling,977 about a “complex of characterizations and
imaginings, stories about events cast in imagery about principles”.978 Through judicial
decision making, courts “participate in an intensely practical and multilayered discourse
about what society should be like . . . [and] . . . can make a special contribution to the
public struggle for meaning and identity.”979 They strive to voice narratives that we
believe in and that express society’s collective choices and values, established through
public debate and dialogue.980 Law is built upon symbols, “a way of talking of one thing
in terms of another, of life in terms of law”.981 Among these powerful symbols are the
concept of rights, which Nedelsky argues are essentially “terms for capturing and giving
effect to what judges perceive to be the values and choices that ‘society’ has embedded in
the ‘law.’”982
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To view judicial opinions as myths depicting particular world views and values is
also, perhaps, to understand how we “experience narratives as moralizing discourse.”983
Law and myth are related, in Smith’s view, insofar as “[t]he mythic structure furnishes
the link between the normative and the natural, between what is and what ought to be.”984
Narratives connect reality with social systems of morality.985 Perhaps we need this link to
be made, Thomas Ross theorizes, because “only in a fully realized story can we
understand the moral teaching.”986 General principles remain “an abstraction without
force until the storyteller provides additional perspective”.987 In other words, “[n]arrative,
which is contextualized writing, makes ‘an abstract claim more tangible.’”988 This
connection between principles and context is mirrored in the conviction that justice and
care and must be integrated, since, as Clement argues, “attention to details . . . is not just
the nonmoral preliminary to the distinctively moral process of applying an abstract
principle, but is itself a moral process. A truly just person, not just a caring person, is one
whose judgments arise out of close attention to contextual details. Deciding which
principles are relevant and what priority to give them requires full attention to context.”989
This is the intersection of contextualism and normativity that Leckey identifies.990
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To attend to context is to make normative evaluations and choices991—as White
explains it, “[a]s soon as you start off on a story, you face a choice as to how to tell it.”992
Essentially, White summarizes, “[t]he judge is always a person deciding a case the story
of which can be characterized in a rich range of ways; and he (or she) is always
responsible both for his choice of characterization and for his decision.”993 Ross views the
judicial opinion as a story that explains the judge’s choice;994 we can therefore “explore
the responsibility of judges as storytellers”,995 recognizing, as Lewis H. LaRue does, that
some stories “are better than others.”996
To acknowledge the choices that judges make between various possibilities—
“various ways in which stories can be told, claims made, and values characterized”997—is
also to recognize that “[t]he law builds itself, over time, by discarding possibilities for
speech and thought as well as by making them; and what it discards is for some person or
people a living language, a living truth.”998 Legal actors should take responsibility for
these lost possibilities999 and remember that the obligation of accountability “gives rise to
story-telling in a context of social (power) relations”.1000 A properly written judicial
opinion, for White, needs to “be a force for multivocality”1001 and “reflect the competing
991
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voices and languages that define the case before it (including those that it ultimately
disregards or silences) and thus expose the ground upon which its own result, its own
achievement, can be qualified and criticized.”1002
Legal actors walk a fine line between fidelity to law’s culture and humility before
the possibilities of other conventions; between defence of law’s values and respect for
others’; between commitment to an intellectual tradition and the responsible exercise of
one’s autonomy; between general principles of justice and contextual details; “between
narrative and theory, between fact and law”.1003 In the metaphor of myths as glasses,
openness to other perspectives might help with the conundrum of how to examine the
“glasses we normally wear . . . without the benefit of the glasses themselves.”1004 We
might improve our formative perspectives if we “decide that it is time we had our eyes
checked,”1005 if we take off our glasses, try on a new pair, look at our glasses, “even clean
them, and put them on again.”1006
In listening to and responding respectfully to community members, courts
establish conversations and relationships with readers and those they write about. We can
explore the “ethical character”1007 of these relations and ask how the speaker’s narrative,
tone, and demeanour help to create, sustain, or undermine relationships with audiences.
We may judge the quality of a narrative by assessing its treatment of those who hold
1002
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different values—whether it denies or accords them respect,1008 whether it leaves room
for distinct and differing voices to be heard,1009 and whether certain voices have been
“left out or objectified”.1010 It is, Van Praagh writes, “[w]hen community members tell
their stories of affiliation, when those stories change shape as they mingle with those of
other communities and their members, when they are listened to, absorbed and retold by
the state, . . . [that] the law truly grapples with the multiple identities and shifting
definitions of integrity that exist for its subjects.”1011 If courts can incorporate these
subjects’ stories and voices into their judicial narratives, then Canadian constitutional law
“may truly reflect the complexities of our lives and connections”1012 and demonstrate “the
possibility for toleration of differences and the recognition of autonomous or
incommensurable communities.”1013
We can also judge the quality of a judicial opinion by the type of reader (and
community) it aspires to create and with whom it establishes relationships. White
envisions an “Ideal Reader, the version of himself or herself that it asks each of its readers
to become”.1014 Such readers open their minds and hearts; they struggle to better
themselves, to grasp other perspectives, to question what narratives or stories are not
being told.1015 For White, judicial opinions are “socially constitutive”:1016 they are
“produced by actual speakers in actual social contexts, addressing actual audiences whom
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they wish to persuade or influence”.1017 They create “a community and a culture of a
certain kind”1018 and “a sense of the facts of the world and what counts as reason within
it.”1019 We may assess judicial opinions according to the narratives they tell about what
society is and should be like, and whether these narratives truly reflect our own stories.
Because the culture of law is constantly being remade by legal actors, these participants
bear a responsibility for the myths and narratives they tell, and “for the nature of that
culture and the world it creates”,1020 which are no less important than the legal principles
and outcomes established by the judicial opinions.1021
In the end, White advises us to judge a judicial opinion according to how true it is
to the relational heart of justice.1022 Justice lies in the manner in which we “regard and
speak to one another”.1023 Through persuasion and exemplification, a judicial opinion
should show us how to lead relational lives, “to be distinctively ourselves in a world of
others: to create a frame that includes both self and other, neither dominant, in a[n] image
of fundamental equality”,1024 recognizing “the equal value of each person as a center of
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worth and meaning, as one who lives in a perpetual process of reciprocal interaction with
nature, language, and other people, by which he is made and through which he makes
himself.”1025
All relational selves inhabit a middle ground “[b]etween two nonexistent
opposites—total freedom and total constraint”:1026 parents making decisions for their
children; adherents living their religion; members of cultural communities interpreting
and re-interpreting their traditions in light of new contexts; legal actors working out the
appropriate relationship between law and other cultures, between principles and facts.
Geertz tells us that once we accept the premise that the isolated self is illusory, the
question becomes “not whether everything is going to come seamlessly together or
whether, contrariwise, we are all going to persist sequestered in our separate prejudices. It
is whether human beings are going to continue to be able . . . through law . . . to imagine
principled lives they can practicably lead.”1027 The question, then, is whether the law can
show us to the equilibrium at the heart of relational autonomy: the capacity to lead lives
and make decisions that are at once principled and caring.
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